Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 1, Number 1, Fall 2015 | Page 34

Business As Usual: The Egyptian–U.S. Intelligence Relationship
footprint in the Middle East may be less influential than during Mubarak’s reign, and
more on Egyptian terms during el-Sisi’s reign. This would include all aspects of the
Egyptian–U.S. relationship, especially defense and intelligence.
Findings and Conclusions
Questions remain, however, on whether the Egyptian intelligence community
will continue to partner with the United States, and if that relationship will
be different now under the direction of el-Sisi. The answer to both of these
questions is “Yes.” Yes, it will continue, and yes, there may be some slight challenges
as both countries move forward with their intelligence relationship.
Our historical analysis confirms that under Mubarak’s regime, Egypt partnered
with the United States based on these interests: stability in the region and countering
terrorism. Through our historical analysis, we found that both countries identified
that they would benefit from each other by partnering in these aspects. 74 Furthermore,
our case study supports the theory that when there is a significant regime change in
which the new leadership may alter the importance of previous interests, a shift or
defection in the intelligence-sharing agreement can be expected. 75 This is supported
by the Arab Spring events that took place in Egypt, causing Mubarak to be deposed
and Morsi to be elected as the new president in 2012. Our case study shows that due
to the significant change in policy implemented by Morsi, there was a significant
lull in intelligence-sharing activity with the United States. The policies implemented
by Morsi, which focused on supporting Muslim Brotherhood interests in much of
the Arab world, were counter to the previous interests that provided the basis of
the Egyptian–U.S. intelligence relationship, which, therefore, altered the previously
agreed terms and policies of the intelligence-sharing relationship previously agreed
to by Egypt and the United States.
However, Morsi’s rule and policies were short lived, and another significant
change in leadership was implemented in Egypt in 2013 by a military coup d’état and
eventual presidential election of el-Sisi. Our case study shows that this additional
new shift in Egyptian leadership returned the original interests of “stability in the
region” and “countering terrorism” back to the forefront. Due to the shift in policy
and interests returning back to their historical status (if not the same, close to),
the Egyptian and U.S. intelligence-sharing relationship will reverted to its original
agreement. However, based on recent actions and past narrative by el-Sisi, this
relationship may alter the terms of the original agreement, perhaps ensuring that all
of Egypt’s interests are represented—even the terms of intelligence. Granted, many of
el-Sisi’s comments center more on democratic and political influence, but these topics
may trickle over into the defense and intelligence relationships.
In sum, it is our conclusion that Egypt and the United States will return to the
Mubarak-era intelligence-sharing relationship while under el-Sisi. We argue that the
events leading up to today have proven that Egypt and the United States will return
back to their intelligence relationship as they did before the Arab Spring and Egyptian
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