Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 1, Number 1, Fall 2015 | Page 33

Global Security and Intelligence Studies
were not necessarily well respected in the Middle East. As a result, many in the Middle
East question the motives of the United States and her desire to establish democracy
in the Middle East now” (el-Sisi 2006).
el-Sisi claims that the United States has known about autocratic leaders that
“claim” they are in favor of democratic reforms, but resist relinquishing control, and
the United States has done little to challenge them if it serves U.S. interests. Instead,
el-Sisi insists “for democracy to be successful in the Middle East, it must reflect Middle
Eastern interests and not United States’ interests only” (el-Sisi 2006). He challenges
whether the United States is ready to accept “Middle East democracy” that could
contend with Western interests or may not be in line with Western policies (el-Sisi
2006).
Additionally, we have seen el-Sisi challenges U.S. influence within Egypt
through recent actions regarding the two administrations. Specifically, during the
interim government and after the 2013 military coups, the United States was calling for
less harsh punishment on anti-coups or pro-Morsi protesters and for more democratic
reforms. Egypt politely “ignored” its calls and pressed ahead with its initial plans and
roadmap, not buckling under the pressure of the United States or the international
community. Furthermore, the United States has also used previously agreed upon
military aid to Egypt as a way to try to influence its democratic roadmap. It was not until
June 2014 that the United States finally unlocked the promised military aid, backing
President el-Sisi’s role in the country (“U.S. Unlocks Military Aid to Egypt, Backing
President Sisi” 2014). This delay in arms delivery from the United States angered the
Egyptian government, sparking Egypt entering into military trading discussions with
Russia (Michael 2013).
In addition to these challenges, some internal Egyptian intelligence agency
adjustments may be incorporated as el-Sisi governs Egypt. Specifically, two of the three
intelligence agencies have survived after Mubarak. One agency, the SSIS, blamed for
the failure in the Arab Spring period, was replaced by EHS, a new homeland security
agency. More reforms are expected to happen in the near future, but the full picture of
what the largest and most prestigious Arab intelligence services will look like remains
unpredictable due to the current complicated political situation in the country.
However, since this agency failed to prevent the fall of the regime during the Arab
Spring, one should expect some radical changes and reforms within the intelligence
community in Egypt after the dust settles from the election. Another expected move
would be the rise of importance and role for the MID, being closer to the military and
a viable alternative to the failing EGIS and SSIS.
In sum, el-Sisi may have returned Egypt’s interests and policies back to
Mubarka-era rule, which places Egypt’s interests back in line with the United States,
and, based on past narrative and recent actions, we can conclude that el-Sisi knows
and understands the importance of the Egyptian–U.S. diplomatic relationship. He also
knows there is a large gap between U.S. policy and reality within the Middle East,
however, meaning that democracy within the Middle East will not develop exactly
as the United States plans or orders. Instead, as expressed by el-Sisi himself, the U.S.
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