Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 1, Number 1, Fall 2015 | Page 32

Business As Usual: The Egyptian–U.S. Intelligence Relationship
speech to the United Nations after being elected president he specifically stated that
“countries should coordinate and cooperate to confront extremist forces and the crisis
of terrorism facing the region” (U.N. General Assembly 2014).
Additionally, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi told Israeli officials that the peace treaty
with Israel “is an important commitment that can be relied and built upon in order
to serve both countries’ interests.” el-Sisi also said that this was the time to “create the
right atmosphere to solve the Palestinian issue and work to spread peace in the entire
Middle East, so the nations of the region could live better” (Al-Sisi: Egypt is Commited
[sic] to Peace with Israel” 2014).
Furthermore, Egypt had banned the Islamic group of Hamas, which posed
a major security threat to the United States and Israel. As previously mentioned,
Morsi reversed this policy, allowing discussion to commence with Hamas under his
presidency. After the 2013 coups, this policy was immediately reversed and Hamas
(along with the Muslim Brotherhood) was redesignated a terrorist organization
(“Egypt Court Bans Palestinian Hamas Group” 2014). Moreover, under Mubarak
and now under el-Sisi, Egypt has promised and worked to stop weapons smuggling
into the Gaza Strip and its de facto Hamas government. In recent years, the United
States may have been facilitating Israeli–Egyptian cooperation on the smuggling issue.
“Reportedly, Israel may be more willing to renegotiate a 2005 MOU [Memorandum of
Understanding] with Egypt to expand the number of Egyptian BGF [Boarder Guard
Forces] from 750 to between 1,500 and 2,200 men. Reports also indicate that Israeli–
Egyptian intelligence sharing has increased” (Zanotti et al. 2009, 20).
el-Sisi, whose main campaign message was to fight for Egypt’s homeland
security against terrorism, has followed in Mubarak’s footsteps to fight against Islamic
militant movements in Sinai and the Gaza border. Many military missions against
“terrorism” in Sinai have been reported after el-Sisi assumed office. During the first
months of his presidency, the Egyptian army destroyed a significant number of Gaza
tunnels and stood firm on the issue during the July–August 2014 Israeli–Palestinian
conflict (Masi 2014) el-Sisi returned Egypt’s interests back to pre-Morsi rule to
“stability in the region” and “countering terrorism,” which fall back in line with the
United States’ interests.
On the basis of these events and policy reversals, it is clear that Egypt has
returned back to Mubarak-era policies, putting them back in line with U.S. interests.
However, it is important to note that even though interests under el-Sisi have returned
to Mubarak-era interests, there are additional challenges facing the Egyptian and
U.S. relationship in the context of the new Egyptian president. Pulling from el-Sisi’s
previous schoolwork completed at the U.S. Army War College on “Democracy in the
Middle East,” his writings give us an insight into his thoughts on an overall Egyptian–
U.S. relationship (not limited to intelligence). el-Sisi claims that the United States
has always put its own interests first and, “as a result, is under constant pressure to
satisfy multiple country agendas that may not coincide with the needs or the wants
of the Middle Eastern people” (el-Sisi 2006). el-Sisi has questioned the U.S.’ motives,
claiming that the “U.S. has supported nondemocratic regimes and some regimes that
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