Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 1, Number 1, Fall 2015 | Page 29

Global Security and Intelligence Studies
tragedy (and) destroy a deep-rooted culture and people.” In addition, he stated, “Egypt’s
position has been and still is clear in rejecting ... the military option and rejecting
participation in military action of the coalition forces against brotherly Iraq” (“Mubarak
warns of ‘100 bin Ladens’” 2003).
There can be little doubt that the regime was genuinely against the war, but it
was caught in a bind. As they declared their opposition to the war, while remaining
committed to maintaining their intelligence-sharing relationship with the United
States, President Mubarak and his government repeatedly warned Washington against
prioritizing Iraq over the Palestinian issue. He called for the conflict to be managed
under the auspices of the United Nations. He also asserted on state television on March
27, 2003 that Egypt was not providing assistance to the U.S.-led coalition (International
Crisis Group 2003).
Lastly, a figure that deserves mentioning due to his contribution toward
strengthening the Egyptian and U.S. relationship during this time and throughout these
events is Omar Suleiman. His authority over the intelligence agencies was during the key
historical events presented above, and he was identified as being the one who established
close relations with the CIA, especially in the issues related to terrorism and Islamic
extremism. During his time as a lead intelligence leader, Egypt was considered a “black
hole” where terrorists could be rendered for interrogation and torture. According to a
number of reports, joint EGIS–CIA rendition started with Tal`at Fu’ad Qassim in 1995
and did not end until recently. In a public hearing before the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, CIA Director George Tenet has said that his
organization took part in more than 80 renditions before September 11, 2001 (National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004). According to Human
Rights Watch, press accounts suggest that the United States has flown 100–150 suspects
to foreign countries, many of them to Egypt, since September 11 (Human Rights Watch
2005, 4). SSIS also cooperated with the CIA on the same issues; cooperation included
many areas other than rendition programs including intelligence exchange and training.
According to former U.S. Ambassador to Cairo Edward Walker, the CIA trained an
Egyptian Special Forces unit in counterterrorism until the program was shut down in
1998 (Grey 2007, 141).
These historical events outlined above demonstrate that Egypt and the United
States shared intelligence based on their similar interests regarding stability in the
region and countering terrorism. However, when change occurred to Egypt’s leadership
during the Arab Spring, this impacted the intelligence-sharing relationship between
Egypt and the United States.
Present and Future Challenges
In December 2010, mass antigovernment protests began in Tunisia and spread across
the Middle East. By February 2011, revolutions occurred in Tunisia and Egypt,
while Libya and Syria experienced their own civil wars. Other Arab countries also
faced protests that varied in size but did not end up with successful revolutions nor did
they have civil wars.
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