Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 1, Number 1, Fall 2015 | Page 28

Business As Usual: The Egyptian–U.S. Intelligence Relationship
Agency (NSA) to intercept intelligence communication from Iraq whereby security
interests of both Egypt and the United States benefited (Sirrs 2010).
Due to its contributions during the war, Egypt’s intelligence was recognized by the
Arab world as the best and most useful intelligence agency in the region. Subsequently,
Egypt’s intelligence kept strong relationship with its partner Arab intelligence services.
They continued to exchange analysis, information, and intelligence of mutual interest
after the war. Egypt also helped other countries develop their intelligence services.
For instance, it was reported that the Egyptian intelligence was training its Kuwaiti
counterpart in interrogation and torture (Murphy 1991).
9/11 Attacks
Mubarak claims that the Egyptian intelligence services passed warnings on to
the CIA and other U.S. intelligence services about al-Qaeda’s intentions to
attack the United States before 9/11 (Tyler and MacFarquhar 2002). President
George W. Bush and the CIA claimed that they did not receive any detailed, specific
warnings on the attacks (Sirrs 2010, 179).
Indeed, the 9/11 attacks were a warning of how Islamic militants were growing
globally. But 9/11 also gave EGIS the opportunity to build on its intelligence relationship
with the United States. The U.S.–Egyptian intelligence relationship was taken to a new
level following the attacks. After the United States announced its War on Terror, Egyptian
intelligence gained greater access to U.S. intelligence and analytical training, the CIA’s
extensive hub of international contacts, and surveillance technology. Subsequently,
Egypt became one of more than 100 world intelligence agencies whose primary goal was
to destroy al-Qaeda’s network (Rudner 2004).
In 2002, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff praised Egypt for
sharing intelligence on the al-Qaeda terror network. As General Richard Myers said
after a meeting with Hosni Mubarak, “We could not ask for more from the Egyptian
government. They have supported us in essentially every way we’ve asked and we’ve also
shared with them what we have in terms of intelligence” (“U.S. Pleased with Egyptian
Intelligence-Sharing” 2002).
Second Gulf War
In Egypt, as in all Arab states, the period of the U.S. military campaign against Iraq saw
government efforts to contain popular anger at the war in a climate already highly
charged by events in Israel and Palestine. “Put in a highly uncomfortable position
by its relationship with the United States, the regime responded by strengthening its
antiwar message and, at times, joining the opposition’s demonstrations.” (International
Crisis Group 2003, 4). Therefore, for the first time, Egypt was in a tough position on
whether or not to support its long-term intelligence ally, the United States.
According to an interview with President Mubarak in 2003, he said that Iraqi
forces fighting U.S. and British troops were “guarding Iraq’s lands and defending its
national honor and nobility in the conflict.” He also said the war would cause a “great
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