Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 1, Number 1, Fall 2015 | Page 25

Global Security and Intelligence Studies
SSIS is largely focused on domestic issues where it has the responsibility for internal
security, counterterrorism, and counterintelligence. Under Egypt’s emergency law,
the SSIS has wide-ranging powers of surveillance and detention. It is often linked to
torture allegations by human rights organizations. However, on March 15, 2011, due
to its failure in countering the Arab Spring revolution, the SSIS was replaced by a new
organization under the new name of Egyptian Homeland Security (EHS) and it is still
tied to the Ministry of Interior (“Egypt Dissolves Notorious Internal Security Agency”
2011). After the military coup of 2013 and the overthrow of the newly elected Muslim
Brotherhood government, nearly one hundred of the sacked senior officers of SSIS
during Muhammad Morsi’s time in power, returned to work under EHS (El Deeb 2014).
Finally, and currently rising in influence and power after the military coup
of 2013, is the Military Intelligence Department (MID). Before the Arab Spring, and
with no significant military threats in sight, the MID used to be largely overshadowed
by EGIS and SSIS as they battled religious extremism at home and abroad. However,
following the latest military coup and the failure of EGIS and SSIS to preserve the status
quo of Mubarak’s regime, the MID seems to be taking over the intelligence community.
It is also the organization fundamentally responsible for monitoring the loyalty of the
armed forces. The current president of Egypt and the former head of the Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, formerly served as the director of
MID between 2010 and 2012 when he allegedly orchestrated a coup against the newly
elected President Muhammad Morsi (“Mukhbarat el-Khabeya” 2011).
Since Sadat’s assassination, these three agencies have constituted the core of
Egypt’s intelligence community. In fact, one of Mubarak’s priorities after becoming
president was to have the secret police investigate the loyalty of the armed forces, and
focus Egypt’s intelligence on the murder of Sadat. Initially, Mubarak’s leadership feared
a larger military conspiracy and immediately imposed a state of emergency. Mubarak
was doubtful of MID’s reliability, and allowed the Ministry of Interior, the Republican
Guards, and the SSIS to play an important role in the days after the assassination to
ensure presidential security.
When Sadat was assassinated, the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) was surprised, as well as concerned. Specifically, it was concerned that Mubarak
would cut ties and blame it for not properly training Sadat’s bodyguards (Woodward
1987, 168). The CIA immediately sent a team to Cairo to assist in the investigation,
ensure the confidence of the new president, maintain the good relationship with the
Egyptian intelligence, and ensure the flow of weapons to the Afghan Mujahideen.
Additionally, the CIA reaffirmed its commitment to help Mubarak’s Egypt neutralize
threats from Libya, Syria, Iran, and Palestine (Sirrs 2010, 152).
It was during this time that mutual interests between Egypt and the United States
come to the forefront to cultivate an intelligence-sharing relationship. Prior to Mubarak’s
reign, there was little information to show why there was an Egyptian–U.S. intelligencesharing
relationship. When Mubarak took over rule after Sadat’s assassination, there
was an increase on the U.S. side to provide capabilities and expertise to help specifically
with stability in the region and to counter-terrorism.
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