This caveat - in the event of war - is important . For now , the threats are all hypothetical , intended to show the North Koreans that the US means business - as well as playing to Trump ' s base - but without crossing the line into conflict . Trump plays the bad cop , while Rex Tillerson plods along as the good cop . He reiterated the US ' offer of talks without preconditions as recently as 12 December , stating that Trump himself was ' realistic ' about the fact that the North could not be expected to give up its WMD programme .
That seemed to change on 20 December . The UK ' s Telegraph ran a story claiming it had information from sources about plans for a ' bloody nose ' attack on the North . Looking more closely at the report however , the caveats are still there : the Pentagon is ' trying to find options ' and ' preparing plans '.
More sanctions on the way ? Amid the loud rhetoric , it ' s easy to miss the fact that US strategy remains guided ( and restricted ) by broader UN consensus . In August , secondary sanctions were introduced against Chinese and Russian firms and individuals accused of aiding North Korea ’ s weapons programme in accordance with a UN decision to target the rogue regime ’ s foreign exchange earnings .
Trump has also insisted that all sovereign nations sever diplomatic links with the North , or face consequences . In November , Singapore suspended trade ties with Pyongyang , while Sudan and the United Arab Emirates cut off diplomatic relations the month before . However , a variety of African countries remain supportive of Kim – and will likely be targeted under future UN sanctions .
" Kim views his missile programme as a deterrent , not an offensive measure ."
The role of China The main obstacle to Trump ’ s sanctions strategy is the power of UN Security Council member China . China maintains close relations with North Korea , which acts as a buffer between China and South Korea . So far , China has vetoed the strongest sanctions – such as cutting off the North ’ s oil supply or freezing Kim ’ s assets – as it is wary of the effects that economic instability could bring . Aside from significantly watering down the UN ’ s sanctions proposals , persistent vetoes or even abstentions from Beijing signal to Pyongyang that China is unwilling to dance to the tune of the UN when it comes to punishing North Korea . However , if the North continues to present a security dilemma for China over the next 12 months , Beijing ’ s North Korea policy could become increasingly stringent , as indicated by reports in December that China had finally agreed to an embargo on oil trade with Pyongyang .
In November , China had called for an end to joint South Korea-US military exercises in return for a de-nuclearisation commitment from North Korea . This is highly unlikely , but we can expect Beijing to continue to push the issue , which it sees as the best way to de-escalate tensions .
Outlook Overall , the most likely scenario is that little will change in the danger North Korea ’ s neighbours face . Any military confrontation would remain localised . As a minimum , South Korea and the US will be keen to avoid escalation in the first months of 2018 due to the Olympics . The enduring source of risk will be from sporadic incidents of violence along the demilitarised zone .
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