Time and motion are pillars of profitability in the gaming business . The more gambling transactions , the more money we make . The problem is there are so many transactions that we can ’ t watch and check each one . We are a high-volume , fast-paced bank that doesn ’ t give out receipts .
they ’ ve had enough . If they ’ re lucky they may have enough funny money left to redeem for cash . No receipts . No questions . What happens in the casino stays in the casino , or at least for seven days , depending on how long the surveillance video is kept .
Cash is king in casinos , and it flows freely and swiftly back and forth between the hands of customers and employees . We encourage our employees to maintain a brisk game pace and to conduct transactions quickly . Time and motion are pillars of profitability in the gaming business . The more gambling transactions , the more money we make .
The problem is there are so many transactions that we can ’ t watch and check each one . We are a high-volume , fast-paced bank that doesn ’ t give out receipts . The more transactions that are not being verified , the more opportunities there are for internal fraud and collusion between dealers and players .
Over the last 25 years I estimate over 90 percent of money cheated from casinos has involved a crooked employee . To put that in perspective , that ’ s close to $ 1 billion . Casinos have become more susceptible to internal fraud and collusion scams because of three main factors :
Factor 1 : Reduced Supervisor Levels on the Floor
For reasons ranging from management ’ s desire to reduce labor costs to simply not being able to find enough people to fill supervisory positions , the effects of removing an important layer of security presence on the floor has increased the opportunities for dealers to steal or conspire with players to cheat the games . This is more prominent in large casinos .
In smaller casinos in Europe and South America , it is not uncommon to see one supervisor for each table . In larger Las Vegas-style casinos it is more common to see one supervisor for four to eight tables .
When the mega-casinos opened in Asia in the early part of the century , they were modeled after Vegas casinos but super-sized . Instead of 100 table games they built them with 300-800 table games . Those casinos suffered some of the biggest cheating losses in history from collusion scams between players and dealers .
A major contributing factor that enabled these monster scams was the inadequate supervisor-to-table ratios coupled with the lack of game protection experience with the supervisors they did have . There simply was not enough seasoned game protection expertise looking over the shoulders of dealers of high-volume , high-limit games .
Regardless of the reason , management should acknowledge that the higher the supervisor-to-table ratio is , the higher the risk . One supervisor simply cannot be as effective from a game protection perspective . With less experienced and protection-savvy personnel in the pit , we weaken overall game protection by taking away a simple principle of fraud detection — trust but verify .
Time and motion are pillars of profitability in the gaming business . The more gambling transactions , the more money we make . The problem is there are so many transactions that we can ’ t watch and check each one . We are a high-volume , fast-paced bank that doesn ’ t give out receipts .
Factor 2 : Lack of Enforcement of Critical Procedures
Reduced supervision and lack of procedure enforcement go together like peas and carrots . Casino gaming floors once hung their game protection hat on a strict diet of battle-proven procedures and military-like adherence to the rules . As can be attested by monthly surveillance-generated procedural violation reports , strict adherence to the procedures diet doesn ’ t seem to be working .
When analyzing most of the industry ’ s major casino scams involving dealer-player collusion , there is usually a breach of a process or procedure that enabled the scam . In defense of gaming supervisors tasked with enforcing procedures , often they simply haven ’ t been told why adherence to a specific procedure is vital .
With their overloaded work responsibilities , this knowledge could help prioritize their supervisory duties in a more effective and riskbased manner . Managers and supervisors should understand and be able to clearly articulate the risk involved to dealers of not adhering to certain procedures and processes .
Let ’ s take the most exploited process on the casino floor in terms of player-dealer collusion scams — the transfer of the eight decks of cards in a baccarat game from wherever they came from to the shoe . Not supervising and verifying this process has cost casinos hundreds of millions of dollars over the years by crooked dealers who conducted false shuffles or assisted players with obtaining inside information of cards and sequences before they were dealt during this process .
The reason so much money has been cheated is twofold : no one was supervising the process and a critical procedure was breached . Yet casinos continue to neglect supervising this high-risk process . Supervisors are encouraged to check other games and service other customers during this process . Maybe if a gaming risk assessment was conducted by management that considered the financial impact of past indiscretions , the tasks and responsibilities of floor supervisors might be prioritized differently .
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