whom the support is owed brings an action for contempt for failure
to pay the court ordered support. The Supreme Court reiterated the
principle that where a court has issued an order, even if erroneous,
the party against whom the order was issued must obey it as long
as it remains in force or until it is reversed, modified, or set aside on
appeal and the failure to obey such order is punishable as contempt
of court. Moreover, the Supreme Court expressed concern over the
District Court’s statement that the support obligor’s retirement
could not be considered a new fact or a material change in financial
circumstances (justifying a reduction or elimination of the support
obligation) because it was discussed during the divorce proceedings
and therefore, would have been something contemplated at the time
of the original divorce proceedings. The Court quite aptly noted
that such a broad application of the “material change” law seemingly
would prevent modification [of a support order] anytime a 401K
or IRA account was involved in the divorce or was mentioned in
passing during the divorce. The Court, however, in affirming the
District Court stated that it was not necessary to determine whether
retirement was anticipated and litigated during the divorce because
the District Court properly found that the support obligor still had
the ability to pay the support obligation despite his retirement.
Gillespie v. National Farmers Union Property
& Casualty Co., 2016 ND 193
In affirming the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the defendant insurer in an underinsured motorist insurance
(UIM) claim, the Supreme Court noted that an insured’s right to
recover UIM coverage from the insurer is unequivocally conditioned
on the insured establishing that she is legally entitled to recover for
injuries resulting from the tortious conduct of the owner or operator
of an underinsured motor vehicle and that it is undisputed that the
insured has the initial burden to establish that liability. Moreover, no
UIM claim is available until the insured has exhausted all applicable
bodily liability policies by payment of settlements, judgments, or
written offers. The denial of liability by the tortfeasor’s liability
insurer (on the part of its insured), by itself, does not resolve whether
its insured is legally liable for any of the UIM insured’s injuries and
is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the limits
of all applicable bodily injury liability policies have been exhausted.
Therefore, as a matter of law, the UIM insured failed to establish
that she was entitled to UIM coverage, and the Supreme Court held
that the District Court properly granted the UIM insurer summary
judgment.
Michael J. Morley received his juris
doctor with distinction and was
admitted to the Order of the Coif upon
graduation from the University of North
Dakota School of Law in 1979. That
same year, he was admitted to practice
law in North Dakota State Courts and
the United States District Courts for the
District of North Dakota. In 1981, he
was admitted in the Minnesota State
Courts and the United State District
Court for the District of Minnesota, as well as the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. He is a member of the
State Bar Associations of North Dakota and Minnesota, and is
currently president and shareholder of Morley Law Firm, Ltd.,
in Grand Forks.
FALL 2016
17