GLOBAL CENTRE STAGE
aimed at lowering greenhouse gas emissions — and thereby
help move India away from the heavy use of coal.
Macron and Modi likewise discussed the possibility of
greater bilateral cooperation involving maritime surveillance,
nuclear energy, satellites and defense (including India’s
purchase of the French Rafale fi ghter jet). In addition to
dealing with questions involving cybersecurity and Artifi cial
Intelligence, the two discussed their mutual concern with
major acts of terrorism that have impacted both countries.
The question of India’s revocation of Jammu and Kashmir
autonomy in August 2019 did obtain G-7 attention. Macron
publicly appeared to accept Modi’s position that Kashmir was
a sovereign matter and that New Delhi and Islamabad could
deal with the Kashmir issue bilaterally. For his part, after his
meeting with Modi, President Trump appeared to back off
on his off er to help “mediate” or “assist” India and Pakistan
over Kashmir. Nevertheless, the question as to whether India
can settle the Jammu/Kashmir dispute with Pakistan and the
Ladakh dispute with China bilaterally ― without some form
of international mediation particularly if confl ict in the region
should erupt ― remains to be seen.
Although Chinese President Xi Jinping was not invited
to the summit, China was the elephant in the room. Given
President Trump’s trade concerns with China, the G-7 did
discuss policies that would simplify regulatory barriers
and modernise international taxation in accord with OECD
frameworks. The G-7 also proposed reforming the World
Trade Organization (of which China and India are members)
to improve intellectual property protection, dispute settlement,
and to eliminate unfair trade practices. Although helpful, it
is dubious that these talks will be able to reduce tensions
between China and the US over trade and monetary policy,
intellectual property theft, cyber-sabotage, and Chinese
irredentist claims in the Indo-Pacifi c region.
The G-7 did make a general statement that called for
violence to be avoided during the Hong Kong pro-democracy
protests and that reaffi rmed the importance of the 1984
Sino-British Joint Declaration that promised that Hong
Kong’s way of life would remain unchanged until 2047.
Yet the G-7 were then accused of “meddling” with “China’s
internal aff airs” by a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson.
The latter “sovereigntist” position ignores the fact that Hong
Kong represents the key intermediary hub between China and
international trade and fi nance — so what happens in Hong
Kong impacts much of the global economy.
Although heavily criticized inside France due to its costs
and its apparent ineff ectiveness to tackle major issues, the
summit did prod the G-7 in a new direction. And on the
international level, President Macron demonstrated France’s
role as a “mediating” and “balancing” power between
competing sovereigntist and internationalist demands. Yet
much more needs to be done.
In addition to dealing with the global economic and
environmental crises, and in the eff ort to better mediate
sovereigntist and internationalist concerns, the G-7 will need
to help put an end to confl ict between Kiev and Moscow over
the eastern Ukraine and Crimea, while concurrently forging
a concerted strategy toward a rising China as it challenges
American, European, Japanese, Indian and Russian interests
as well. To take decisive steps toward such a strategy, the G-7
should consider the membership of both Russia and India in
the formation of a new Group of 9 (G-9) ― that China could
possibly join in the future — assuming appropriate political
conditions can be met by all three countries.
*Author is a Professor of International and Comparative
Politics, American University of Paris. He is the author
of World War Trump: The Risks of America’s New Nationalism
(Prometheus Books, 2018) and IR Theory, Historical Analogy
and Major Power War (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). Website:
www.hallgardner.com
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist • Vol 7 • Issue 9 • September 2019, Noida • 31