European Policy Analysis
evidences only show that Commissioner Byrne was ripe to the idea , not that he engaged in policy entrepreneurship .
The SARS crisis has been a focusing event in the sense used by Birkland ( 1998a ) that it was sudden , rare , and potentially harmful . Nevertheless , the impact of SARS on the European continent was limited . According to the WHO ( 2015 ) in the month preceding the Commission ’ s proposal ( July 2003 ), 33 cases had been reported in the European continent — excluding Russia ( 31 in the EU ). At the end of year 2003 , the WHO concluded that 25 cases were confirmed in the EU , 27 in total for the continent ( excluding Russia ), with one case resulting in the death of the patient . All cases were imported ; there was no domestic spread of the epidemic , no local transmission . At global level , however , 8096 cases were confirmed .
The crisis seemed a matter of global scale rather than a continental one . But the SARS crisis was framed by the European Commission as the example of a problem that if inflicted to the European continent would be devastating without a European Agency . First , the Commission framed SARS as a threat , even if the threat was limited “ Communicable disease outbreaks can pose a significant threat to the health and well-being of the European Union ’ s citizens , as shown during the recent spread of the SARS virus ” ( European Commission 2003a ); but clarified that this was only one of the possible iterations of a systemic risk : “ A major outbreak such an influenza pandemic could have catastrophic consequences ” ( European Commission 2003a ). The risk of a similar outbreak was thus what the proposal suggested to tackle : the Commission framed the SARS to show that competencies were lacking at the EU level , defining “ public health matters as an area where Community competencies should be consolidated ” ( European Commission 2003a ; 2003b ). The solution the European Commission was looking for was not a tool to solve the threat of the SARS outbreak ; rather it was the result of considerations that the EU could be at risk . Therefore , the Commission defined the problem as the recognition of new needs for the EU and emerged as an agent taking responsibility for finding a solution .
I identify the first step of bricolage done by the Commission which is to open a window by framing conditions as a problem that can and must be fixed . The next step is to engage on a path of consequential search for fit . Taking cues from bricolage , I reason that the Commission pieced together a good fit for the definition of the problem : fill the capacity building gaps at the EU level in the field of disease prevention and control . Therefore , I now investigate the policy formulation aspect of bricolage .
Coupling by Bricolage : Policy Formulation
The last parts of this paper gave us the picture of the streams , up to the opening of the policy window . After the presentation of the mechanisms that led to bricolage rather than the emergence of a policy entrepreneur , this part focuses on bricolage as policy formulation and the consequences on the decision-making process .
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