European Policy Analysis Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2016 | Page 59

European Policy Analysis

to derive directly from the (expected)
separateness of IRAs [independent
regulatory agencies] from politics and
organized interests” (ibid.).

According to Bauschke (2010) “[e]
ven though research on agencification
on the European level has expanded
considerably in the last few years, it
seems striking that questions of social
legitimacy regarding the delegation to
unelected bodies have not entered the
debate” more vividly. When we now
address EIOPA’s positioning within the
triangle of European political institutions,
national regulators and the public in this
early, defining phase of its existence, this
is intended as a contribution to reduce
the deficit Bauschke is pointing at. We
argue that EIOPA has, after some initial
wavering, taken a course projecting its
self-image as purely technical. Whatever
the merits of this strategy are in terms of
the quality of its advice resp. legislative
input, EIOPA thereby contributes to the
continued depoliticization of the pensions
issue within the Euro crisis. More precisely,
to adopt the terminology proposed by
Wood and Flinders (2014), we hold that
this phenomenon is to be classified as
belonging to the third, discursive face of
depoliticization, that is, the variant that
is pushing matters into the nonpolitical
“realm of necessity.” And this is exactly
where most European leaders prefer to see
the external effects of “rescuing” the Euro.
Apart from the questionable effect this
might have on European monetary and
fiscal policy, it amplifies a wider and more
virulent long-term danger, since it reduces
“the motivation to pay attention to what
politicians say and do and correspondingly
diminish the value of participating in
democratic mechanisms” (Vibert 2007).

In the following, we address

all the topics raised in Section 4.1, but
taxation receives a disproportionate share
of attention. At one point in EIOPA’s
preliminary report, a lapse in copy-editing
points to the fact that at least one internal
faction sees it as crucial (“Taxation seems
to be the a [sic!] significant hurdle that
prevents the emergence of a single market
for PPPs”; EIOPA 2014b, Paragraph 142)
and we agree with that judgement.

In terms of its role perception,
moreover, EIOPA comes across as
increasingly frustrated by the tension
between its lack of competencies and
the Commission’s expectations. At
times, EIOPA reacts outright snappish.
In the column titles “resolution” of the
table EIOPA produced of stakeholder
comments, in reaction to a particularly
critical question regarding which type of
contract qualifies a PPP for tax advantages,
EIOPA states that “PPP is a not an EIOPA
project, but a COM initiative. […] Work on
this issue must be done by the competent
authority” (EIOPA 2014a, resolution
to com. 56)—that is, not EIOPA. In a
similar vein, in its preliminary report to
the Commission, EIOPA comes to the
conclusion that
[T]axation, social law, as well as
difficulties in the harmonization of
contract law, appear to be the most
significant hurdles to developing
a PPP single market. […] EIOPA
therefore acknowledges that further
analysis may be needed concerning
the conditions (PPP characteristics)
each MS sets in order for premiums/
contributions to qualify for beneficial
tax treatment. EIOPA will closely
follow the progress of COM and
OECD on this matter. (EIOPA 2014b,
Paragraphs 187–189)
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