European Policy Analysis Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2016 | Page 21

European Policy Analysis

and international levels (Avery 1996).
Newer studies, drawing on multilevel
governance and the ecology of games,
point to the fact that the same actor
simultaneously participating in various
processes that are shaped by different
rules could produce very different actions
and draw in different interests in each of
those processes (Klijn, Koppenjan, and
Termeer 1995; George 2004; Hoberg and
Morawski 2008; Smaldino and Lubell
2011; Leifeld and Schneider 2012). This
is why two embedded or overlapping
subsystems have the potential to produce
very divergent policy outputs or outcomes
(Capano and Howlett 2009).

Here, we thus ask what might
explain the different policies that are
defended within the national and
international sphere: is it the result of
very different actors participating in both
processes? Or, do actors who take part in
both not have the power to coordinate
actions across two levels? Or, do they
defend very divergent interests in each
process?

To answer those questions, we
adopt social network analysis focusing
on actors’ identification, their relational
profiles, interests, and resources. Through
interviews, survey data, and content
analysis, we focus on those actors’ positions
within national and international climate
politics. Studying Switzerland constitutes
an interesting case for several reasons: the
unique position of Switzerland was that
the content of its climate policy varied
strongly between the domestic scale—
with a weak commitment to mitigation
policy and tools such as a CO2 tax—and
the international scale—with a strong
involvement in the field of mitigation
and adaptation. Furthermore, the Swiss
domestic climate policy followed a typical

industrial country perspective, focusing
considerably on climate mitigation
whilst fuel consumers (transport,
energy, and industry representatives)
tried to extensively influence the policy
outputs. Internationally, and since
2001, Switzerland has been integrated
in the Environmental Integrity Group
(EIG) of the United Nations Framework
Convention
on
Climate
Change
(UNFCCC)—also including Mexico,
South Korea, Monaco, and Lichtenstein.
The Group is unusual within the UN
climate regime architecture because
it mainly aimed for a strong focus on
adaptation measures and stronger
responsibility by developed and emerging
economies in promoting new adaptation
funding schemes. Switzerland was one of
the driving forces within this group and
thus promoted a completely different
policy strategy (focusing on adaptation)
toward climate change than in its domestic
agenda.

Background

I

n the early 1990s, the proposed
project of imposing a CO2 tax in
Switzerland failed. Afraid of a second
policy deadlock, the government adopted
a different strategy in 1995: private
partners were included in the design of
the new CO2 act mandating a 10% CO2
emissions reduction by 2012, compared
with 1990 emissions. In 2002, a report
showed that the voluntary agreements
planned thus far would be insufficient
to achieve the necessary reduction
(Prognos2002). In such a situation, the act
foresaw the introduction of the incentive
CO2 tax. Importantly, together with the
tax, Switzerland also planned introducing

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