European Policy Analysis Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2016 | Page 16

Immigrants, ISIS the Refugee Crisis, and Integration in Europe in 2004, when Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined. It, in fact, occurred after 2008, despite several efforts by Obama to improve the relationship. The most recent NATO enlargement involved countries— Albania and Croatia—that are not on Russia’s borders. It is true or at least arguable that, with hindsight, the Europe and the United States might have taken a more consultative and inclusive position vis à vis Russia during most recent NATO expansions and during Ukraine’s European Union association negotiations. But these mistakes, if that is what they were, cannot possibly justify Putin’s behavior since then: his 2008 war against Georgia and, above all, his 2014 annexation of Crimea, an invasion (as Putin eventually admitted) and border alteration of the sort not seen in Europe since World War II. Von Beyme, rather incredibly, does not mention Crimea at all. Perhaps more importantly, neither Putin nor anyone else in Russia can tell sovereign states which associations they may or may not join. Moreover, Russia’s treatment of Georgia and Crimea suggest that the fears of Eastern European countries that sought NATO membership were entirely justified. That so many in Germany, a country that has gone to such great lengths to repudiate its own history of militarism and imperialism, should indulge Russian militarism and imperialism is as mystifying as it is unconscionable. There are further factors worth mentioning, none of which is flattering toward Putin or reassuring for his German sympathizers. All evidence suggests that Putin is utterly hostile to the idea that countries he regards as within the Russian sphere of influence—Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, along with the rest of the Caucasus and Central Asia— might determine their own future, and he likes destabilized states that he can draw into his sphere of influence. Domestic politics also play a role here: Putin’s turn to extremism—his closing down of the free press, the exile and poisoning of his critics, the murder of journalists— correlates with his overwhelming fear of a domestic reaction against his corrupt and autocratic regime, above all since 2008. For Putin, power is a zero-sum game: when others have it, he does not, and when others are weak, he is strong. It is possible, and horrifying, that what Putin wants in Syria is not so much an Assad victory—bad enough, but one with which a tough realist could live if it brought stability—but permanent conflict and a flow of militarized refugees to a Europe that he will never forgive for applying sanctions on Russia. Putin is particularly incensed by Germany, a country he flattered himself into believing he understood because of his KGB résumé and knowledge of the language, as it was Chancellor Merkel who anchored the sanctions agreements. Again, it is odd that von Beyme adopts such a critical stance toward Western neoimperialism while remaining seemingly indifferent to Russian neoimperialism. Von Beyme’s discussion of immigration and refugees is equally ambitious and thought-provoking. Von Beyme is absolutely right that efforts to achieve responsibility sharing the distribution of refugees have resulted in absolute failure. I am doubtful, though, that better negotiation would have changed the result. There partly was not sufficient time—hundreds of thousands 16