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The elections in the “ TRNC ” in December were a major factor before the referendum . As a result of the elections , opposition parties ( pro-status-quo ) had an equal number of deputies as the pro-Annan plan parties in the parliament . Taking the outcome of elections and Ankara ’ s pressure into consideration , Denktaş agreed to restart the negotiations within the framework of the Annan plan 26 . In January 2004 , Erdoğan met with Annan and assured that he would support the restarting of the negotiations . This was the beginning of Turkey ’ s “ one step ahead ” policy on Cyprus . The final version of the Annan plan was prepared by the end of March and it was decided that the twin referenda would take place on 24 April 2004 27 . The results of the referenda were quite surprising : 64.9 % of the Turkish Cypriots voted ‘ yes ’, meanwhile , 75.8 % of the Greek Cypriots voted ‘ no ’. As experts explain , under Turkish pressure the majority of the Turkish Cypriots voted for the plan because it was essential for Turkey ’ s advancement towards the EU . On the other hand , the RoC voted against the plan because it was going to join the EU a week after the referendum in any case 28 . This became the first time that the Turkish Cypriot side was not blamed for the negative result . Leaders of different countries and the European Commission welcomed and congratulated Turkish Cypriots ’ for their “ courageous ” ‘ yes ’ vote 29 . Despite the outcome of the referendum , the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU on 1 May 2004 .
The 2004 Progress Report welcomed Turkey ’ s October 2 decision to add Cyprus to the list of countries to which the Customs Union regimes would apply . In December 2004 , the European Council meeting decided that the accession negotiations with Turkey would start on October 3 , 2005 30 . As it was planned , on October 3 , 2005 , the accession negotiations were opened . The Negotiation Framework defined the principles governing the negotiations . It was mentioned that Turkey ’ s progress should be measured by Turkey ’ s compliance with some requirements : the settlements of disputes , including the comprehensive settlement
26
Kınacıoğlu M . & Oktay E ., The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey ’ s Cyprus Policy : Implications for Turkey ’ s Accession to the European Union , Turkish Studies , 7 ( 2 ), ( 2006 ), 261 – 273
27
Oran B ., Türk Dış Politikası ։ Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular , ( Belgeler , Yorumlar , 2013 ). [ Turkish Foreign Policy : Facts , Documents , Comments from the War of Independence to Today ] ( Vol . 3 ), p . 657 . İletişim Yayınları .
28 ibid ., pp . 661-663
29
Excerpts from Statements and Decisions / Resolutions Following the Referenda Held in Cyprus on 24 April 2004 . ( 2004 ). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey . http :// www . mfa . gov . tr / what-the-world-said-after-the-referanda . en . mfa
30
European Council in Brussels . ( 2004 ), 8 , https :// www . ab . gov . tr / files /_ files / Zirve _ Bildirileri / PresConc _ 17122004 . pdf
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