It seems that Hafez al-Assad gave much importance to the Sunni culture , and instead of highlighting differences , he attempted to find commonalities between the two groups aiming at integrating Alawites within the majority 25 . The feeling of Sunni superiority could be seen in several instances within the Syrian public discourse . For example , Sunni Islam was taught in public schools , orthodox Sunnism was the public Islam , etc . Certainly , it is quite challenging to state whether Assad ’ s regime has alleviated or exacerbated the tensions between Sunnis and Alawites . If referring to Haklai ’ s three indicators discussed below to evaluate such instances is justified , then a general conclusion is that there is a significant decline in tensions between those two groups . The first indicator is the existence and activities of an ethnic opposition to Assad ’ s regime . After the Muslim Brotherhood ’ s defeat , there seems to be neither internal political pressure on the Alawi government nor an alternative ruling power proposed by the opposition . It can indeed be claimed that if there was no threat to political stability under Assad ’ s administration , then his government was at least tolerable for all domestic political players . Otherwise , it could have continuously challenged the power and status of the ruling elite .
The second indicator for measuring the tensions is the number of released political prisoners during Assad ’ s administration period . In the early 1970s , when Assad had just come to power and aimed at weakening or abolishing the political opposition which could be a threat to the legitimacy of his government , the number of political prisoners increased drastically- many people were even detained without holding a proper trial . However , Assad changed his policy on imprisonment for political grounds after almost twenty years of his presidency . By December of 1995 , he approved the release of more than 1200 Syrian political prisoners . Presumably , a dominant majority of the political prisoners who were set free had been members of the Muslim Brotherhood or supported the Brotherhood ’ s activities in some way . The third indicator is the Sunni population ’ s desire to take part in governance . This willingness includes not only the positions that give political power and influential roles but also those that are more symbolic and ceremonial . Assad allowed the inclusion of some Sunnis within governmental agencies , which has given them an opportunity to partake in some decision-making processes- particularly those related to the economy 26 .
25
Phillips Christopher , Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria , Third World Quarterly 36 , no . 2 ( 2015 ), 357 – 76 .
26
Haklai , A Minority Rule over a Hostile Majority , 2000 , 43-45 .
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