ESQ Legal Practice Magazine JUNE 2014 EDITION | Page 60

and that this power would
only be exercised in deserving
cases. His Lordship further
held that the power of the
Court to grant injunctive
reliefs pending arbitration is
derived from the provisions of
Article 26 (3) of the Rules
made pursuant to the
Arbitration and Conciliation
Act and Section 13 of the
Federal High Court Act.
Lastly, in Lagos State
Government v. PHCN & 2
Ors (2012) 7 CLRN 134, the
Lagos State High Court held
that it had the jurisdiction to
grant an order of interim
reliefs pending arbitration,
notwithstanding the fact that
an arbitration proceedings
was on-going between some
parties to the action. Just like
the Statoil Case cited above,
the Lagos State High Court
relied on the provisions of
Article 26 (3) of the Rules
made pursuant to the
Arbitration Act in arriving at
this decision.

irrespective of the fact the
entire issues in dispute
between the parties have not
been submitted for the
determination of the Court.
Also, the mere fact that Article
26 (3) of the Rules was not
pronounced upon by the
Supreme Court in MV S.
Araz's Case goes further to
show that the principal issue
which was considered by the
Court in MV S Araz's Case is
whether the admiralty
jurisdiction of the Federal
High Court could be activated
by an action for security for
damages in respect of an ongoing arbitration, and not
whether the Federal High
Court could grant an order of
injunction pending arbitration.
Furthermore, in MV S. Araz's
case, the Applicant for an
order for interim reliefs
pending arbitration did not
adduce any evidence to show
why it did not bring the
application before the Arbitral
Tribunal before bringing it to
theCourt. Thus, the mere fact
Should the Case of NV
that the Applicant could have
Scheep v. MV S. Araz (2000) brought the application for
15 NWLR (Pt. 691) 622 Act as interim reliefs before the
a Bar Against the Granting of Arbitral Tribunal, but it failed
an Order for Injunction
to do so, is enough ground for
Pending Arbitration?
the Court to have refused to
It is submitted that the case of grant the order for interim
NV Scheep v. MV S. Araz
reliefs pending arbitration.
(Supra) ought not to be
This is because an application
permitted to act as a bar
for interim reliefs pending
against the granting of an
arbitration ought only to be
order of injunction pending
made to the Court in rare
arbitration because the
cases where the Arbitral
provision Article 26 (3) of the Tribunal cannot consider it or
Rules made pursuant to the
where it cannot be made
Arbitration Act is quite clear
before the Arbitral Tribunal
that a Court has the power to due to a delay in the
grant an order of injunction
empanelment of the Arbitral
pending arbitration
Tribunal.

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Lastly, the law is well settled
that judicial precedents are not
of much value in cases
involving the exercise of
discretion. See: Dokubo-Asari
v. FRN (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt.
1048) 320 at 350. Thus, since
the decision of a Court to
either grant or refuse an
application for injunction
pending appeal/interim
measures pending arbitration
is based on the exercise of
judicial discretion, it is
submitted that the Court
ought not to allow the exercise
of its judicial discretion to be
fettered by the decision of the
Supreme Court in MV S.
Araz's Case.
In conc \