ECOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE
136
In light of this ideological ‘diversity5, who, indeed, is to say which ‘desire
for nature’ is objectively more rational, ethical, or valid than any other? Why
shouldn’t the privileged express their sensual desire for nature, relaxing at lush
island resorts where indigenous workers refill their Margaritas? Why shouldn’t
white middle-class Americans express associative desire by communing with
‘nature’ by appropriating Native American rituals while actual native peoples
can no longer practice such rituals because their lands are stolen or poisoned
by toxic waste? Why shouldn’t privileged First World theorists express their
differentiative desire for nature by writing elaborate theories that blame
immigrants and women for destroying ecosystems by ‘overpopulating’?
In turn, can we assert an objectively rational ground for a social desire in
general? While we have the potential to cultivate the socio-erotic in a
cooperative direction, we also have the capacity to direct our desires in an
authoritarian
or capitalist direction, using sexuality for domination and
intimidation and creativity for profit to enhance personal status and authority. If
we fail to identify a set of criteria for making such distinctions, we have no way
of asserting that the social desire for non-hierarchy is more ethical or ‘erotic’
than die desire to construct hierarchy, or that ecological cultivation is more
ethical tiian a capitalist rationalization of nature. Without a stable, general, or
objective criteria for determining what makes social desire more ethically valid
than anti-social desire, the quality of our relationships with each other and with
the rest of the natural world becomes just a matter of arbitrary personal
opinion.
To transcend this relativism, we must anchor ideas about the ‘desire for
nature’ in something more stable than subjective inclination. The real question
becomes: on what can we ground an organic rationality that will be able to
distinguish between desirous actions that enhance or threaten an evolutionary
trend toward increasing social and ecological complexity?
NaturaI.
EvoluTioN As A GrouncI
For
A SocbL Eihics Of
DesIre
To address this problem of objectivity, we might again turn to the natural
philosophy of social ecology. Dialectical naturalism is an approach to natural
philosophy developed by Bookchin which builds on, yet transcends, the
dialectical traditions of such thinkers as Llegel and Marx.13 For Bookchin,
‘nature’ is a dialectical process of unfolding that is marked by tendencies
toward ever greater levels of differentiation, consciousness, and freedom. While
it is beyond the scope of this book to fully explore this rich and important
theory, we may look briefly at a few key concepts drawn from Bookchin’s
dialectical naturalism to elaborate our understanding of social desire.
Bookchin appeals to the idea of natural evolution to establish ecological
principles which we may be utilized to evaluate the ethical dimensions of our