THE FIVE FINGERS OF SOCIAL DESIRE
101
desire. According to Jessica Benjamin, each of us yearns to participate in what
she calls “mutual recognition,” a process in which two complete selves
recognize each other as both dependent and independent. For Benjamin, the
desire to both recognize otherness and to be recognized creates a dynamic
tension which propels us to develop the capacity to recognize another person
as a separate individual “who is like us, yet distinct.”10 For Benjamin, the idea
of mutuality is predicated on this rich dialectic between two distinct selves
rather than on a collapse of two selves into one.
Benjamin’s notion of erotic “mutual recognition” differs dramatically from
Freud’s notion of erotic union.
For Freud,
union between individuals
represents a desire “to make the one out of the more than one” in which the
“more than one” represents a static totality, a suffocating unity that requires a
negation of individual identity.11 For Freud, because the self is inherently
hostile to encounters with other distinct selves, erotic union requires the loss of
self, permitting two identities to merge into one. Thus, for Freud, the desire to
become one requires a unity achieved through the negation of self. In contrast,
Benjamin’s mutual recognition entails a unity in diversity. It implies a unity of
distinct selves based on independence and interdependence. In turn, it implies
a differentiation within association, a desire to maintain individual identity
while recognizing a connection to others. Together,
differentiative and
associative desire can form an erotic dance between autonomy, community,
individuality, and collectivity.
Differentiative desire is essential to true association with and to true
differentiation from others. To know the particular ways in which we are
distinctive, to understand our own complex motivations, dreams, and visions,
allows us to ‘get ourselves out of the way’ when we seek to really see others.
Paradoxically, knowing self allows us to really see and know others, for when
we know ourselves, including our own prejudices, motivations, likes, and
dislikes, we can see all that may obscure our ability to really recognize another
person.
Whereas
self-contemplation may represent a
personal
indulgence,
authentic self-knowledge may serve a vital social purpose. For what we do not
know about ourselves is potentially dangerous to others. For instance, in the
case of racism or sexism, social ignorance can be lethal. What men do not
know about the history of being men, or about their own socialization, or
about how their desire for women has been constructed, may be dangerous to
women. Most white people know little about the historical origins of their
ideas of ‘race’ or ‘whiteness,’ remaining ignorant of the ways in which they
benefit from and perpetuate hegemonic racist practices. Throughout history,
die oppressed have always paid dearly for what the oppressors do not know
about themselves.