Diplomatist Magazine DIplomatist September 2018 | Page 30
SPOTLIGHT
other considerations for the Khan government include urgent
fi nancial assistance to improve the shambolic economic
situation in Pakistan. Pakistan will not get that assistance
from the sanctions-ridden Iran. More importantly, the re-
imposed US sanctions may thwart any hopes of increased
bilateral trade between Pakistan and Iran in the coming
months.
Therefore, it remains in Pakistan's national interest to
embolden relations with rich allies such as Saudi Arabia and
other Arab countries. Nevertheless, Khan's government will
reciprocate to Iran's diplomatic overtures while prioritising
relations with Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Pakistan may
not increase bilateral differences with the US despite its open
support to Iran on the JCPOA issue. Islamabad understands
that such a move may risk placing Pakistan on a further
collision course with Washington, and even Saudi Arabia,
of which there could be long-term economic and diplomatic
repercussions.
Managing Ties with the US, Afghanistan, and India
US-Pakistan bilateral relations are at a new low and there
is a possibility of further deterioration of ties under the new
civilian leadership in Islamabad. In August, Washington
warned against any IMF bailout for Islamabad, which it fears
the latter might use to repay its debts to China. The US also
suspended funds for training Pakistani offi cers under the US
government’s International Military Education and Training
Programme. On the contrary, Washington has intensifi ed
pressure on the new government in Pakistan to act against the
Haqqani Network and the Taliban, as the security situation
in Afghanistan gets worse. Differences over the situation in
Afghanistan and Washington's burgeoning relations with
New Delhi may continue to remain as Khan's foreign affairs
department will have limited room to negotiate with the US.
Pakistan's ties with Afghanistan will continue to remain
tense under the new government as there appears to be no
end of violence, and the Afghan Taliban are unlikely to give
up their campaign against the Kabul government and foreign
forces in Afghanistan. However, the PTI government may
take a few steps to approach Kabul in the coming months.
Pakistan's new Foreign Affairs Minister Shah Mehmood
Qureshi has already made a visit to Afghanistan in an attempt
to reinvigorate bilateral relations with the neighbouring
country. To what extent such efforts materialise into
something substantial will depend on the outcome of the
ongoing peace process with the Taliban.
The Trump administration has increased pressure on
Pakistan to do more on the terrorism issue. Ultimately, the
key to Pakistan's Afghanistan policy will remain in the hands
of the powerful military establishment. Therefore, it will be
interesting to see whether the security establishment allows
the Khan government to make some changes in its traditional
Afghan policy, which is to expand infl uence in Afghanistan
with the help of proxy groups. With the growing partnership
between India and the US on the Afghan issue, the military
establishment might not allow enough manoeuvring space to
the new government in Islamabad.
On relations with India, Khan's government has shown
desire to restart the dialogue process. However, the recent
cancellation of the foreign ministers talks scheduled to take
place on the sidelines of the 2018 United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) session has once again revealed the
persistent mistrust between India and Pakistan. Tensions at
the Indo-Pak border have increased after the barbaric killing
of a Border Security Force (BSF) soldier and continuing
infi ltration into Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) from the Pakistan
side. The Indian government, while interested in talking to
the new government in Pakistan, is concerned about the
upcoming state elections and the General Elections due in
2019. For now, it appears the 'status quo' will be maintained
between the both countries as there are meagre chances of
any bilateral engagement. However, if the intent of Pakistan's
military establishment remains focused on reconciliation with
India, some major developments may take place in the next
couple of years.
Looking Ahead
While PM Khan did not really explain his government's
new foreign policy in the inaugural address to the nation,
foreign minister Qureshi’s news conference on 20 August
provided a blueprint of the same. Besides passing on a
message of peace to the governments of Afghanistan and
India, Qureshi also tried to dispel the general impression that
the security establishment is the real in-charge of Pakistan's
foreign policy and that the core of the new policy will be
'Pakistan First'.
The new government may witness new challenges in
formulating and executing foreign policy in a complex
international and regional environment. So, despite positive
signals from Khan and Qureshi's speeches, Islamabad will
have a diffi cult time improving relations with Afghanistan,
India, and the US. Khan has been critical of the US policy
priorities in South Asia, especially in Afghanistan, in the past.
But after taking charge of the Prime Minister's Offi ce, can his
government afford to have acrimonious relations with the US?
It seems unlikely as his 'experienced' foreign minister would
consider having tenable relations with all major powers —
China, the US, Russia — despite outstanding bilateral issues.
Moreover, there are lesser chances of any major change in
Pakistan's foreign policy objectives under Khan's government.
* The author is Researcher at Centre for Internal and
Regional Security (IReS) and Institute of Peace and Confl ict
Studies (IPCS)
30 • Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist • Vol 6 • Issue 9 • September 2018, Noida