Diplomatist Magazine DIplomatist September 2018 | Page 30

SPOTLIGHT other considerations for the Khan government include urgent fi nancial assistance to improve the shambolic economic situation in Pakistan. Pakistan will not get that assistance from the sanctions-ridden Iran. More importantly, the re- imposed US sanctions may thwart any hopes of increased bilateral trade between Pakistan and Iran in the coming months. Therefore, it remains in Pakistan's national interest to embolden relations with rich allies such as Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. Nevertheless, Khan's government will reciprocate to Iran's diplomatic overtures while prioritising relations with Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Pakistan may not increase bilateral differences with the US despite its open support to Iran on the JCPOA issue. Islamabad understands that such a move may risk placing Pakistan on a further collision course with Washington, and even Saudi Arabia, of which there could be long-term economic and diplomatic repercussions. Managing Ties with the US, Afghanistan, and India US-Pakistan bilateral relations are at a new low and there is a possibility of further deterioration of ties under the new civilian leadership in Islamabad. In August, Washington warned against any IMF bailout for Islamabad, which it fears the latter might use to repay its debts to China. The US also suspended funds for training Pakistani offi cers under the US government’s International Military Education and Training Programme. On the contrary, Washington has intensifi ed pressure on the new government in Pakistan to act against the Haqqani Network and the Taliban, as the security situation in Afghanistan gets worse. Differences over the situation in Afghanistan and Washington's burgeoning relations with New Delhi may continue to remain as Khan's foreign affairs department will have limited room to negotiate with the US. Pakistan's ties with Afghanistan will continue to remain tense under the new government as there appears to be no end of violence, and the Afghan Taliban are unlikely to give up their campaign against the Kabul government and foreign forces in Afghanistan. However, the PTI government may take a few steps to approach Kabul in the coming months. Pakistan's new Foreign Affairs Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi has already made a visit to Afghanistan in an attempt to reinvigorate bilateral relations with the neighbouring country. To what extent such efforts materialise into something substantial will depend on the outcome of the ongoing peace process with the Taliban. The Trump administration has increased pressure on Pakistan to do more on the terrorism issue. Ultimately, the key to Pakistan's Afghanistan policy will remain in the hands of the powerful military establishment. Therefore, it will be interesting to see whether the security establishment allows the Khan government to make some changes in its traditional Afghan policy, which is to expand infl uence in Afghanistan with the help of proxy groups. With the growing partnership between India and the US on the Afghan issue, the military establishment might not allow enough manoeuvring space to the new government in Islamabad. On relations with India, Khan's government has shown desire to restart the dialogue process. However, the recent cancellation of the foreign ministers talks scheduled to take place on the sidelines of the 2018 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) session has once again revealed the persistent mistrust between India and Pakistan. Tensions at the Indo-Pak border have increased after the barbaric killing of a Border Security Force (BSF) soldier and continuing infi ltration into Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) from the Pakistan side. The Indian government, while interested in talking to the new government in Pakistan, is concerned about the upcoming state elections and the General Elections due in 2019. For now, it appears the 'status quo' will be maintained between the both countries as there are meagre chances of any bilateral engagement. However, if the intent of Pakistan's military establishment remains focused on reconciliation with India, some major developments may take place in the next couple of years. Looking Ahead While PM Khan did not really explain his government's new foreign policy in the inaugural address to the nation, foreign minister Qureshi’s news conference on 20 August provided a blueprint of the same. Besides passing on a message of peace to the governments of Afghanistan and India, Qureshi also tried to dispel the general impression that the security establishment is the real in-charge of Pakistan's foreign policy and that the core of the new policy will be 'Pakistan First'. The new government may witness new challenges in formulating and executing foreign policy in a complex international and regional environment. So, despite positive signals from Khan and Qureshi's speeches, Islamabad will have a diffi cult time improving relations with Afghanistan, India, and the US. Khan has been critical of the US policy priorities in South Asia, especially in Afghanistan, in the past. But after taking charge of the Prime Minister's Offi ce, can his government afford to have acrimonious relations with the US? It seems unlikely as his 'experienced' foreign minister would consider having tenable relations with all major powers — China, the US, Russia — despite outstanding bilateral issues. Moreover, there are lesser chances of any major change in Pakistan's foreign policy objectives under Khan's government. * The author is Researcher at Centre for Internal and Regional Security (IReS) and Institute of Peace and Confl ict Studies (IPCS) 30 • Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist • Vol 6 • Issue 9 • September 2018, Noida