Diplomatist Magazine Diplomatist October 2019 | Page 55
INSIDE EUROPE
where India has not given unlimited access to EU banks and
companies.
Third, there are disagreements with regards to Intellectual
property protection standards. The EU wants India to
strengthen its intellectual property rights regime, for instance,
with regard to pharmaceuticals. Indian legislation bans both
‘ever-greening’ of patents (extending the time coverage of
patents just before they expire, through minor changes to
the product) and the exclusivity of test data (protection of
clinical trial data), saying they jeopardise the sale of low-
priced generic drugs and chemicals in its territory. Fourth is
the termination of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). India
signed BITs with several Member States of the EU in order
to protect investments. However, in 2016 India unilaterally
decided to terminate BITs with 57 countries including the UK,
Germany, the Netherlands and France scraping key protection
for foreign investors. India decided to terminate the BITs in
order to re-negotiate the old treaties on the basis of a new
model text for BIT. The contentious issue is the Investor-State
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provision requiring investors to
exhaust all domestic procedures before seeking international
arbitration. The EU is opposed to the new ISDS provision
and has urged India to extend the old-investment treaties by
six months before resuming the BTIA talks.
Apart from these issues, a major issue for India is to get
recognised as a data-secure country by the EU; without such
recognition, the fl ow of sensitive data can be hindered, thus
increasing operating costs for Indian businesses operating
in the EU. However, given EU concerns over its regulatory
norms and data-privacy standards it is unlikely that the EU
will agree to this demand. Along with these, on the Indian
side, there remain several apprehensions including, legally
binding clauses on Human Rights, social and environment, as
well as labour standards, where India as a developing country
has diffi culty in complying.
What Next for the India-EU Free Trade Agreement
Since the time the negotiations have been stalled, India
has come a long way in re-calibrating its economic sphere
and has set itself a target of becoming a $5 trillion economy
by 2025. India is pursuing its modernisation drive through
various initiatives like Make in India, Digital India, Start-
Up India, and Invest in India etc. It has presented itself as a
reliable, responsible and up-coming economy. The European
Union is fully aware of the potential that the Indian economy
presents and the avenues it opens up for joint synergies. The
potential of India was also highlighted in the EU’s strategy
on India which was released in 2018. The strategy recognised
India as one of the largest economies with an annual growth
rate of around 7 percent and on its reaching the US$ 7.8
trillion economy by 2030. The strategy stressed on realising
the untapped potential of trade and investment relations. The
strategy paper states that India still has a “strong reliance on
exports and inward investment, and reluctance to open up to
imports”. “The EU will continue to encourage India to open
up its economy to strengthen its international competitiveness,
benefi t from a better integration into global value chains, and
increase its share in global trade, to bring it more in line with
its growing share of global GDP,” it asserted.
Therefore, resuming negotiations is crucial for both the
partners because the EU is India’s largest trading partner
and benefi ts accrued in increasing trade volume would help
both. It is also important as both India and the EU represents
large markets and the demographic dividend which is in the
favour of India can also help EU in the long run with the
movement of skill labour and professionals. Also, increased
market access would also help integrate the services sector
thereby increasing the scope of cooperation and joint ventures.
Although the contentions in the negotiations present a bleak
picture, the re-starting the negotiations and eventual signing
of the agreement would be benefi cial to both the partners.
References:
EU-India Trade, Department of Commerce, Ministry of
Commerce & Industry, http://commerce-app.gov.in/eidb/ergn.
asp, Accessed on 3 October 2019
India-EU Bilateral Brief, Indian Embassy, Brussels, 17
March 2018, https://www.indianembassybrussels.gov.in/pdf/
Revised_Brief_Unclassifi edmar19_2018.pdf, Accessed on 3
October 2019
EU-India Fact Sheet, EU Strategy on India,
https://cdn2-eeas.fpfis.tech.ec.europa.eu/cdn/farfuture/
bKxeumPzObF8OEde6SrD5qWyKo9-suTMQp3ZZLfv93M/
mtime:1542703624/sites/eeas/files/eu-india_factsheet_
november_2018.pdf, Accessed on 3 October 2019
Bhaswati Mukherjee (2018), India and EU: An Insider’s
View, (New Delhi: Vij Books)
India and prospects for closer EU ties, Briefi ng, European
Parliament, 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/
etudes/BRIE/2017/608679/EPRS_BRI(2017)608679_EN.pdf,
Accessed on 3 October 2019
Joint Communication: Elements for an EU strategy on
India, European Commission and High Representative for
Foreign and Security Policy, November 2018, Brussels,
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/fi les/jc_elements_for_an_
eu_strategy_on_india_-_fi nal_adopted.pdf, Accessed on 3
October 2019
*Author is Research Fellow, Indian Council of World
Aff airs.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are that of the Researcher
and not of the Council.
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist • Vol 7 • Issue 10 • October 2019, Noida • 55