Diplomatist Magazine Diplomatist March 2019

GLOBAL CENTRE STAGE his team must learn from the past mistakes of the last year. President’s statement in public domain matters diplomatically a lot so there is an urgent need to stop quick and fast tweets by the President. shortages since the mid 1990s. AlthoughKim had oﬀ ered to discuss denuclearization which raised hope for a long sought diplomatic solution yet the deadlock arose when North Korea kept the condition of removing sanctions completely. The position of North Korea The fundamental disagreements between the two countries rested on relief from sanctions and steps to dismantleNorth Korea’s nuclear weapon program. The United States imposed sanctions against North Korea in the 1950s and tightened them further after international bombings against South Korea by North Korean agents during the 1980s. The United States added North Korea to the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Though the Clinton administration had given some reliefs of economic sanctions yet it was short lived. North Korea continued its nuclear program and oﬃ cially withdrew from the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty in 2003. North Korea also conducted nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, 2016 and 2017. UN Security Council passed a resolution against North Korea. Initially, sanctions were focused on trade, bans on weapons-related materials and goods but later it expanded to luxury goods to target the elite. Further, these sanctions expanded to cover ﬁ nancial assets, banking transactions and general travel and trade. From 1950 to 2008, trade between the United States and North Korea was restricted under the US trading with the Economy Act of 1917. In February 2016, the North Korea sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 was passed which imposed many restrictions on North Korea. In August 2017, the countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act was passed on 21 September 2017, President Donald Trump issued Executive order 13810 allowing the United States to cut from its ﬁ nancial system or freeze assets of any companies, business, organizations, and individuals trading in goods, services, or technology with North Korea. On July 2011, during Brussels summit, NATO leaders called for continued pressure and ongoing sanctions enforcements on North Korea. According to John Bolton, the United States seeks to implement the “Libya Model” on North Korea’s nuclear program in which Libya denuclearized and was invaded by NATO in 2011. On 13 November 2018, US Vice President Mike Pence and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reaﬃ rmed the need to keep sanctions on North Korea to achieve its denuclearization. According to analyst Andrei Lankov, the real growth rate of North Korea is 3-4 percent. Its economy is a centrally planned and least open economy. After self-imposed isolation, Kim burst onto the international diplomatic stage in 2018 initiating summits with South Korea and China and a historic ﬁ rst meeting between North Korean and US leaders. After decades of economic closeness, mismanagement and resource misallocation, North Korea had faced chronic food Next steps Neither President Trump nor the Tyrant Kim commented on when the next round of talks would take place. Trump already emphasized that he was in “No Rush” for North Korea’s denuclearization and all that he cared about was that no nuclear or ballistic missile tests should occur on his watch. In the middle of the Hanoi Talk, President Trump faced a domestic turmoil. His former lawyer Micheal Cohen told Congress the US President was “a racist”, “conman” and “Cheat”, which may have proved to be distractions for Trump in Hanoi. Additionally, North Korean Leadership will prefer to wait to see the results of next year elections in the US. Conclusion Though, the Hanoi conference cannot be called successful yet it was not completely failed. Diplomacy is still the way forward because there is no other option besides talking on the table. But certain measures should be applied. Hasty steps from both the sides without proper preparations cannot provide the way to success. Failure to reach an agreement raises the question of whether Trump should have joined Kim for a second Summit so soon. The United States must now rigorously test North Korea’s intentions and for further negotiations, diplomatic pressure should be made to reach a viable solution. The North Koreans must be told that there will be no more summits until working level negotiations make progress. There is an urgent need to identify stumbling blocks of the summit and eﬀ orts should be made jointly to remove all hurdles.  *Author is working as Associate Professor in the department of Political Science, Prayag Mahila Vidhyapeeth Degree College, Prayagraj. Dr. Dubey has contributed in many ways in the fi eld of academics. She has edited four books on the current issues and National or International Political Scenario. More than three dozens of her papers are published in National or International journals and magazines. She was invited by the Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, Thailand to deliver an invited speech. She was invited by many universities and colleges as Resource Person in the National and International seminars and conferences. She was also nominated for Bharat Jyoti Award. She is serving society and her institutions by performing various books and attained the reputation of a good and devoted teacher in the academic world. 44 • Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist • Vol 7 • Issue 3 • March 2019, Noida

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