Diplomatist Magazine Diplomatist March 2019 | Page 40

Prior to the summit,
there was a
transfi xed terror that
Trump was going to
make all manner of
earthly concessions
for crumbs, and
offer a good number
of goods on a gold
platter, to the North
Korean leader.
taking corresponding measures.” He was optimistic at the
time, drawing upon themes of fl exibility and novelty in the
approach to diplomacy being taken by both parties. “Neither
leader is constrained by traditional expectations that might
doom their teams to try the exact same approach as in the past,
with no expectation of anything but the same failed outcome.”
The president’s preliminary chats over dinner with Kim
prior to the formal summit did not give much away. He
proved enthusiastic and characteristically optimistic. “Great
meetings and dinner tonight in Vietnam with Kim Jong Un of
North Korea,” he tweeted. “Very good dialogue. Resuming
tomorrow!” Those aching for detail and fi lling were left
disappointed. By breakfast the next day, things had cooled.
Cancellations of a working lunch followed, and the scene
was being set for a premature departure.
The smoke has yet to clear and maybe hovering for some
time yet. The language of summitry is often best left to time
to harden and clarify; in the immediate aftermath, little value
can be gauged from bits of anger and spaces of irritation. But
the US president was impressed by Kim’s off er to dismantle
the enrichment facility at Yongbyon in its entirety (though
it is clear that the totality of the DPRK’s capacity goes
beyond it). The discussion and proposed transaction list at
Hanoi seemed somewhat threadbare; a total lift of sanctions
for Yongbyon’s dismantling was hardly a complete picture.
According to Trump, giving very little by way of detail,
“Basically they wanted the sanctions lifted in their entirety,
but we couldn’t do that.”
The response was not long in coming. Ri Yong-ho,
North Korea’s foreign minister, suggested another version,
somewhat more nuanced and certainly less absolute: that
only some sanctions be lifted in exchange for the permanent
and complete dismantling of the main facility, verifi ed by
US experts. “Given the current level of trust between North
Korea and the United States, this was the maximum step for
denuclearization we could off er.”
Prior to the summit, there was a transfi xed terror that
Trump was going to make all manner of earthly concessions
for crumbs, and off er a good number of goods on a gold
platter, to the North Korean leader. A bemused Trump simply
deemed it “false reporting” on his “intentions with respect
to North Korea.” Both parties would “try very hard to work
something out on Denuclearization & then making North
Korea an Economic Powerhouse.”
This was far from the case. As Joel S. Wit and Jenny
Town noted with some accuracy in 38 North (Feb 28, 2019),
“It’s ironic that while most pundits and the media kept up a
steady drumbeat that he was going to give away the store, he
did just the opposite, holding out for a better deal.”
The issues at stake on the Korean Peninsula seem
40 • Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist • Vol 7 • Issue 3 • March 2019, Noida