Diplomatist Magazine Diplomatist August 2018

SPOTLIGHT As to the “Fateh”, or Conquest Alliance, led by Hadi al- `Amiri, which came second in the elections with 48 seats, it is very close ideologically and organizationally to Iran. It is also close ideologically to former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and his Da`wa Party which gained 25 seats in the new parliament (compared with 92 seats in the previous parliament – a big retreat!). Regarding the Victory Coalition of current Prime Minister Haidar al-`Abadi which came third with 42 seats, it was propelled into third place on the heels of the victory achieved against ISIS/Daesh under the leadership of Prime Minister `Abadi. In the same way that Al-Hashed al-Sha`bi, or Conquest Alliance, came out second with high election scores due to its key role in rolling back ISIS from northern and western Iraq, in coordination with the Iraqi army. Both Al-Fateh and the Victory parties/coalition did not exist in the previous parliament. Because no single parliamentary entity can form a government by itself, in light of the results, the attempts to form broad parliamentary coalitions are a must. The jockeying by various entities to form a broad governing coalition, which began in earnest after the Iraqi Supreme Court ratiﬁ ed the election results on August 19, has not yet produced any agreement as of today (August 25). Hence, as the forthcoming governmental coalition is yet to be ironed out or yet to be declared, some important factors may be highlighted which shall shape this coalition and thereby the new government: One, Muqtada al-Sadr is expected to nominate the next Prime Minister, as his coalition is the biggest one in parliament. Al-Sadr himself was not a candidate in the election, and therefore he could not be the next Prime Minister according to the Constitution, because he is not an MP. Two, Hadi al-`Amiri’s Conquest Alliance, as the second biggest parliamentary block, and as reﬂ ecting the new strong role and inﬂ uence of Al-Hashed al-Sha`bi in the liberation campaign from ISIS, is also expected to be in the government, particularly moreover that Al-Hashed is an extension of the recent inﬂ uence of Iran in Iraq and the role of Qassem Sulaimani, Commander of Iran’s al-Qods Brigade, who was instrumental in training the units of Al-Hashed. This expected participation in the government by Al-Hashed may likely apply on the parties of Nuri al-Maliki and Ammar al-Hakim as well. Three, Haidar al-`Abadi, who is pro-American, and was strongly propelled in 2014 by the United States to replace Nuri al-Maliki as prime minister, is expected to participate in the forthcoming government. The anti-American political parties and entities in Iraq, such as Muqtada al-Sadr and Al-Hashed al-Sha`bi, could not yet isolate or stamp out the inﬂ uence of the United States in Iraq. Four, the Kurdish parliamentary parties/coalitions, notably the KDP, which are also backed by the United States, will be expected to be part of the government. Five, Iyad `Allawi will also likely be part of the governmental coalition, because, as former Ba`thist he is on good terms with Syria and close to it, and Iran may not oppose his participation in the cabinet due to its alliance with Syria. Six, the Arab Sunni entities in the parliament, notably those of Osama al-Nujaiﬁ and to a lesser degree Jamal al-Karbouli, could not be left out of the cabinet, simply because of what might be called “covenant” reasons with this historically important demographic component in Iraq, yet one which became most devastated since the American occupation. The overall low voter turnout of 44.5% of eligible voters across Iraq was doubly lower in the devastated Sunni areas, and thus the Sunnis shall likely be represented in the cabinet, not based on their parliamentary win and size in the Parliament as such, which came out to be relatively very small, but for convocational reasons à la Lebanese model. Otherwise, disaffection among the Sunnis will be further accentuated. Conclusion In sum, Iraq’s latest parliamentary election produced a new domestic political balance of power in which “Iraqism” and secularism were somewhat strengthened again as reﬂ ected in the substantial relative sizes of the coalitions of: Muqtada al- Sadr, Haidar al-`Abadi, Iyad `Allawi, and Osama al-Nujaiﬁ , on the one hand, and the big shrinking of some particularly sectarian parties, such as the Da`wa of Nuri al-Maliki (from 92 deputies to 25), on the other hand. Even though Al-Hashed emerged as markedly a sectarian Shiite militia, its key role in getting rid of ISIS shall contribute to enhancing national integration and unity in Iraq – provided of course that rancorous politics and vindictiveness recede in the political process, and the rampant corruption by the new Shiite political elites and nouveaux riches, who have come to control the government since occupation, are dealt with by law. * Dr. Naim Joseph Salem is a Professor of International Affairs and Diplomacy, Notre Dame University, Lebanon Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist • Vol 6 • Issue 8 • August 2018, Noida • 43

Diplomatist Magazine Diplomatist August 2018 | Page 43