PERSPECTIVE
create something which, so far, is not that strong in content but
is quite important symbolically”. Italy ignored Brussels, despite
the EU commission’s paper issued last week branding China as
a “systemic rival”, threatening to regulate Chinese investment
in Europe and highlighting the security risk over Huawei 5G
network. Italy did not consult Brussels or Washington when
signing the MOU. The geopolitical calculation has been made
to move ahead with China just like 12 other EU nations who
had signed MOUs on OBOR before Italy. In the future, it is
clear many other countries in Europe will follow Italy’s position
owing to China’s expanding economic power and failure of
Brussels to adopt a common policy on China that could benefi t
all EU nations. While some nations like France and Germany
are benefi ting from Chinese trade, Italy and southern European
nations feel left out. This imbalance of trade with China will
open bilateral prospects for the southern nations and former
Soviet bloc nations in central Asia.
I witnessed the same during a visit to Kazakhstan, Astana
where the Central Asian country with its hard steppe zone
of black fertile soil is a testimony to Beijing’s attempt at
dominating its central Asian minority areas. Kaplan describes
this situation as “smothering them (central Asian states) with
development, even as the Chinese build urban nodes for a
postmodern Silk Road of long-distance highways, railways,
and energy pipelines linking China with the former Soviet
republics nearby”.
With its connected geography, Europe and Asia are the two
most important regions in global trade. According to Parag
Khanna (Diagram S.0) they account for $1.6 trillion more than
the transatlantic at $1.3 trillion and US-Asia at $1.4 trillion.
The US power balance in Eurasia is at decline. Stephen Walt
argues that this is due to liberal hegemony spelled out after
the Cold War with a misleading foreign policy followed by
one leader after another from Clinton, Bush, Obama and now
Trump. United States interference, to entanglement on regime
changes in the Middle East, has not economically benefi ted
them. Protecting and restoring the democracy agenda to win the
local communities has failed due to its double standards. China,
on the other hand, prefers to only strengthen the economic and
trade agenda of OBOR supporting nations. In this equation, the
existing global power United States has accused the emerging
power China on “Predatory loans” or “Debt trap diplomacy
quoting Sri Lanka on many occasions.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo citing Huawei in Budapest
said “Beijing’s handshake sometimes comes with strings,
strings that will leave Hungary indebted both politically and
economically,”. French President Emmanuelle Macron has
warned saying Beijing “took advantage of our division”.
Whatever the criticism China keeps winning nation after
another into its global agenda. In Sri Lanka, the division on the
Beijing factor is deep and polarized. This is refl ected through
our policy makers who are engaged with the two spheres of
infl uence – the US and China. Our nation’s policy makers are
defi cient in articulating foreign policy and oscillate between
two increasingly divided fractions of Washington and/or
Beijing. The two fractions are further supported by proxy
nations such as India, Japan with the US and Russia with China.
Not only does the pendulum swing with higher frequency
between poles, but the swings themselves have become more
extreme and visible. It spins on security and power projection;
a clear example was the US aircraft carrier John C. Stennis
who navigated Sri Lankan waters a few weeks ago followed
by1000 Australian troops with their four vessels who docked
in Colombo and Trincomalee this week, soon to be followed
by the Chinese frigates in a few months’ time.
Another example of the pendulum’s swing between
the poles is on issues surrounding Sri Lanka’s strategic
infrastructure including ports and airports and power grids. This
short term vision which lacks strategic depth has a signifi cant
threat to national security. If the Government of Sri Lanka
decides to award Mattala Airport to India which could be seen
as a proxy pulling strings towards the big power, it will be a
move to counterbalance Chinese infl uence and not an economic
decision. Chinese built Mattala airport sitting 25 km from
Hambanthota Port is now on discussion, since the Government
lacks a strategic path it only has a leasing out path thinking on
short term economic benefi ts.
According to the RAND Corporation - a leading US think
tank “China sees its security environment in terms of four
concentric circles” in the grand strategy of OBOR fi rst targeting
the developing nations and then the developed nations. First
innermost ring encompasses China’s existing geography;
second ring contains the land and water body directly adjacent
to China. This periphery is most essential for the stability of
China. The Third ring consists of entire Asia-Pacifi c, and
the Fourth ring is everything beyond Asia (Figure S.1 from
RAND). The report highlights the signifi cant growing infl uence
of China in these circles over time particularly, in developing
countries. “China could setup more military bases, although
may not call them bases” in these countries, argues RAND. As
for the report, Sri Lanka falls in the Third circle and what you
witness is nations in the Second and Third circle have migrated
from non-binding MOUs to “Pivotal Regional Partnerships”
(PRP) with China. Nations like Italy in the Fourth circle will
also follow just like the Latin American nations to establish
PRPs with China. China could establish PRPs, but its pivotal
OBOR partner nations should understand how China might
act economically, diplomatically and militarily vis-a-vis the
United States in time of confl ict or peace. Many nations see
OBOR as a solution for economic prosperity only through
an economic vantage point. The geopolitical prism must be
addressed for it holds more implications for the nation and its
internal policies in the long run.
*Author is Director General, Institute of National Security
Studies Sri Lanka (INSSSL)
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist • Vol 7 • Issue 4 • April-May 2019, Noida • 39