COUNTRY FOCUS
in both the eyes of Paris and Berlin. It remains an open
question whether this will be achieved by initiatives such as
the “Hanseatic League” on eurozone issues. The Hague has
the potential to expand on a northern agenda and constellation,
but this might constrain its role to that of a veto actor. The
goal of securing the partnership with Germany and winning
standing with Paris might be reversed.
The message of closer interaction between the smaller but
capable members would have to be a constructive one — an
ambition to be part of the solution and not of the problem,
just like France and Germany like to see their roles in the
EU. Such a group, committed to using and shaping the EU
as a means to address common interests and challenges,
could be valuable to the Franco-German tandem. After all,
in the current EU, France and Germany cannot count on a
stable support coalition. Dutch diplomacy cannot rely on
getting good marks on the policy infl uence rating in the EU
Coalition Explorer alone if it is looking to lead this closer
cooperation. ECFR’s analysis reveals some weak spots for
the Netherlands in its relations to other countries. Looking
at interaction preferences, for example, Austria places the
Netherlands in second place though with considerable
distance from Germany on all three dimensions measured by
ECFR. Austria, meanwhile, does not show up at all on the
Dutch interaction radar. The same pattern obtains for Ireland:
the strong Irish interest in dealing with the Netherlands is
met with indiff erence. The asymmetry in interaction with
Luxembourg is profound; the impact of the Grand Duchy
on the Dutch radar is minimal. The Netherlands’ focus on
Denmark is moderately strong but in turn much weaker than
the Danish interest in interacting with The Netherlands. The
gap also signifi es unused potential, because Denmark lacks a
solid mutual relationship with any other member state while
being aff ected by Britain’s exit from the EU as much as the
Netherlands. All of these weak spots need to be addressed if
the Dutch want to secure and enhance their privileged role
among the wealthy smaller EU members.
The Netherlands may also need to reach beyond its
neighbourhood or friends. Here, the Dutch outreach
currently primarily focuses on the north. Austria, Slovenia,
and Portugal show interest in the country but do not enjoy
a mutual response. Other countries in the south and east of
the EU have no joint link with the Netherlands. It is telling
that seven of the eastern and south-eastern EU members do
not list the Netherlands as the most infl uential among the
affl uent smaller countries. Deepening relations with Portugal,
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and the Baltic states would be
the fi rst step for the Dutch to broaden their outreach, going
beyond their comfort zone, but still being less challenging
to approach successfully than for other countries. The map
of countries showing disappointment with the Netherlands
reveals where the major hurdles are found in eastern and
south-eastern Europe.
On the other hand, the Dutch EU policy does not lack
confi dence in its impact. Among respondents to the ECFR
survey, 9 percent of the votes on overall infl uence went to the
Netherlands, which is the third highest vote after Germany and
France with 21 and 19 percent respectively, ahead of Britain at 8
percent and Italy at 7 percent. The Dutch respondents, however,
put their own country at 15 percent — nowhere in the EU is
the view of the country’s overall infl uence more favourable
than in the Netherlands itself. The Dutch are not the only ones
to overstate their infl uence; actually, misreading this is rather
widespread among capitals, as shown elsewhere. Countries
with an even higher overstatement of their infl uence compared
to the general view are Italy, Spain, Ireland, and Sweden.
One reason for Dutch overconfidence could be the
complementarities of their agenda with that of many other
countries. The most critical issues for the next years from
a Dutch perspective are immigration and asylum policy;
completion of the single market; climate policy; single fi scal
policy; and common digital policy. But only one, climate
policy, is much more a Dutch issue than is shared with
many other member states. On other issues, the Netherlands
fi nds many partners sharing their preferences and is named
relatively often as a preferred partner by them. Some linkages
are particularly worth pursuing in light of the outreach options
discussed above. Thus, the single market issue could be a
strong bridge towards deepening contacts with the EU’s east,
whereas climate policy is not just a priority in Denmark or
Sweden but also in Portugal.
The domestic public opinion represents a key constraint
on the leadership ambitions in the Dutch EU policy. Though
ECFR’s EU Cohesion Monitor shows a weak rise in attitudes
towards the EU and growing approval of EU policy outcomes,
a comparison between preferences of policy professionals
and the general public generally show less support for EU
among the latter. The sample for the Dutch public is not fully
representative and should be an indication. But the message
is fairly clear: in contrast to the professional view, the public
is less supportive of addressing new challenges in the circle of
all member states, except on eurozone governance, a common
social policy, or common defence structures. Here the support
for EU-wide initiatives is more extensive than among the pro-
fessionals, who tend to favour moving ahead in smaller circles.
Ultimately, a visibly engaged Dutch policy seeking to
build coalitions and shape decisions in the EU will have
to deliver on the expectations of the people. Infl uence and
reputation form part of the delivery, though they could hardly
compensate for the lack of more tangible outcomes. However,
if the alternative was not to move ahead on crucial issues
for the Netherlands because of a lack of agreement, then
leadership in coalition-building could become an essential
resource of domestic political support.
* Author is Head, ECFR Berlin, Senior Policy Fellow
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist • Vol 7 • Issue 4 • April-May 2019, Noida • 11