Knowledge Partner
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist
While the de Mistura mission con * nues, it is also necessary to look for the reasons for the failure of the Annan and Brahimi missions. Annan and Brahimi failed for no fault of their own, but we can draw valuable lessons from their media * on. In 2012, the UN developed a guide for effec * ve media * on based on an in-depth study of such efforts by the UN and others. The observa * ons can be listed under a few categories:
1. Mission and Mandate: The mandate can be wide or narrow. Both Annan and Brahimi were given a rather narrow mandate. For example, Brahimi wanted to invite Iran, a key player, but owing to objec * on from the US and the others, Iran was not invited to Geneva II. Annan did not have the choice to explore the op * on of a power-sharing a r r a n g e m e n t w i t h A s s a d remaining in office.
2. Impar @ ality and Inclusivity: If the mediator is to work for transfer of power from the incumbent to a newly created body, it follows
If the mediator is to work for transfer of power from the incumbent to a newly created body, it follows that the incumbent will not see the mediator as impar @ al.
that the incumbent will not see the mediator as impar * al. While it is desirable to be as inclusive as possible in choosing the interlocutors, the mediator should also consider the risk that intransigent interlocutors with limited influence can spoil the process.
3. Entry and Consent: If the par * es to the conflict who find themselves in a state of a‘ hur * ng stalemate’ approach the mediator, his task will be easier. If only one of the par * es is interested in media * on and that too only when that party is losing ground, there is no chance of success for the media * on. The people who are vic * ms of the conflict might suffer enormously, but the par * es to the conflict might not care as in the case of Syria.
4. Strategy: What comes first, ceasefire or a poli * cal arrangement? If the ceasefire comes first and if there is no rapid progress towards a poli * cal seQlement, the ceasefire might not last. If there is a poli * cal seQlement, the ceasefire can be a component of it. It is difficult to nego * ate a seQlement when the two sides are killing each other. Obviously, there cannot be a standard opera * ng procedure in this regard.
Brahimi engaged intensively with the intra-Syrian par * es, more so with the mul * tudinous opposi * on groups. He asked Assad to be a " kingmaker " rather than king and he did not like it. The Syrian government delega * on came to aQend the Geneva II Conference only to please Russia on which it was cri * cally dependent. The delega * on wanted to discuss only‘ terrorism’, as in Assad’ s eyes all his adversaries are terrorists. The opposi * on wanted to discuss only transi * onal government and wanted the process to begin with Assad’ s exit, a demand that was uQerly unrealis * c.
Assad has not lost, but he has not won either. He has survived at a
Image 33: Joint Special Envoy of the United NaLons and the League of Arab States on the Syrian Crisis, Kofi Annan( R), with the Spokesperson for UN-Arab League
Assad has not lost, but he has not won either. He has survived at a terrible cost. Peace, stability, and speedy reconstruc * on— poli * cally and otherwise— in Syria are much needed. Those who love peace, and hate war and know its fu * lity, should never give up.
Lessons and Prospects
Annan began his mission in an unfavourable climate. As men * oned earlier, the opposi * on and its external supporters had arrived at a wrong conclusion that Assad was about to fall. The very designa * on as joint representa * ve of the UN and the LAS detracted from his acceptability in Damascus ' eyes. Annan deliberately resorted to‘ crea * ve ambiguity’ in the choice of words about the transi * onal government. But that stratagem did not work.
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