Knowledge Partner
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist
"The LTTE might well believe that it can win a separate state by force. If it does
believe that, as it may well do, it is making an absolute horrendous mistake."
Lakshman Kadirgamar
short-comings. Firstly, the war The root causes have to
victory was leveraged to extend
be addressed in terms of
poli*cal life spans through
amending the Cons*tu*on. This consolida@ng Sri Lanka’s
was to make space for the president ethnic make-up and
of the *me to remain in power ensuring that it is not
indefinitely. This move altered Sri poli@cally craied.
Lanka's democra*c fabric and led to
the downfall of the president in
2015. A failure in conflict diplomacy by the Rajapaksa regime was a cause
of this downfall. The former regime failed to effec*vely engage with the
Tamilian diaspora, who represented an alienated community ajer the
defeat of their poli*cal dream of Eelam. Secondly, in the ajermath of the
conflict, the Rajapaksa regime failed to implement its own “Lessons
Learned and Reconcilia*on Commission Report" drawn up in 2011. This
de-legi*mised the reconcilia*on process in its en*rety. Thus, it is evident
that conflict diplomacy must endeavour to be mul*-pronged in its
approach.
D
espite the Libera*on Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) being militarily
defeated, its ideology for a separate state (Eelam) remains steadfast
among its many diaspora members outside Sri Lanka. This is one
example of how conflict diplomacy in the 21st century is laced with
complexity due to the nature of conflicts - which are no longer sta*c - and
the evolu*on of diplomacy to face new challenges. The UN refers to conflict
diplomacy within the broad rubric of “diploma*c ac*on taken to prevent
disputes from escala*ng into conflicts and to limit the spread of conflicts
when they occur…the most common expression of preven*ve diplomacy is
found in the work of envoys dispatched to crisis areas to encourage
dialogue, compromise and the peaceful resolu*on of tensions.” In this regard,
one of the key roles of a diplomat is to engage in both the preven*on and
management of conflict and its ajermath.
Sri Lanka embarked on conflict diplomacy during its conflict with the LTTE as
well as in the post-conflict era. The country's experience with conflict
diplomacy is unique in that peace was not 'brokered', despite several
diploma*c engagements and media*on by the interna*onal community.
Rather, it came from within the country, and was not externally leveraged.
Successive governments since the
beginning of the conflict in the 1980s
made an effort to end the conflict and The country's experience
garner peace by invi*ng the LTTE to a with conflict diplomacy is
poli*cal solu*on. However, this
unique in that peace was
method failed due to mistrust on both
not 'brokered', despite
s i d e s a n d ce a s efi re a g re e m e nt
several diploma@c
viola*ons.
According to Philip BobbiQ, it is a necessity for diploma*c strategy, which
is designed to produce a “preclusive victory” to include “conflict
preven*on, successful nego*a*on, deterrence, the prepara*on for
conflict should all else fail, and efforts to establish order, ensure stability,
and promote poli*cal and economic pluralism ajer conflict.” The laQer
part of this statement – to promote poli*cal pluralism – evaded both the
Rajapaksa and the Sirisena governments due to ethnic coali*ons and
na*onalist sen*ment. Thus, for Sri Lanka, internal poli*cs have for too
long plagued prosperity, which illustrates a gap in the country’s means of
implemen*ng conflict diplomacy. External actors have also played a key
role not only in trying to manufacture peace deals during the war but also
in its ajermath - with claims of human rights viola*ons that were taken
engagements and
Conflict diplomacy in Sri Lanka was media@on by the
always temp ered by na*onalist
interna@onal community.
extremist poli*cal sen*ment. It
prevented the moderate poli*cal
leaders from the south and north of the country from arriving at a peaceful
resolu*on to the conflict - such as the devolu*on of power. Instead,
na*onalist fervour led to exploita*on of ethnic iden**es, and moderates on
both sides were labelled traitors. Poli*cal leaders such as Vijaya
Kumaratunga were clear examples of moderate leaders who nego*ated with
the LTTE in the 1980s but were called traitors and eventually assassinated
due to their allegiance and support for the 13th amendment.
Conflict diplomacy con*nues to be relevant for Sri Lanka in preven*ng the
re-emergence of war. The root causes have to be addressed in terms of
consolida*ng Sri Lanka’s ethnic make-up and ensuring that it is not poli*cally
crajed. Since 2009, post-conflict diplomacy in the country has had many
Image 28: Civilians displaced from parts of Kilinochchi and MullaiLvu districts during
the military offensive in January 2009.
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