Diplomatist Magazine Annual Edition 2018 | Page 50

Knowledge Partner
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist

In 1990, Nepal ushered in a mul *-party democra * c system, preceded by a topsy turvy poli * cal course and a struggle for existence as an independent country. However, the road to democracy hit a snag early on, in its fijh year, as the Red Rebels— grouped as the Maoists— launched what they called a " revolu * on " to overthrow the monarchy and " liberate " Nepal from the influence of " imperialist America and hegemonic India."

A civil war broke out in 1996 and approximately 17,000 people were killed in the decade-long conflict that also witnessed physical infrastructure worth billions being destroyed. In 2006, the Indian government reviewed its stance on Nepali Maoists whom it had declared ' terrorists ' and concluded that they were the true representa * ves of the people of Nepal in the changed context. On 27 January 2009, India ' s then External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee confirmed through an interview to Al Jazeera that India played a mediatory role in bringing the Maoists and Nepal ' s key poli * cal par * es together. The new equa * on was built on an ' an *-monarchy ' plakorm seeking to end the 240-year-old monarchy— a core mission of the Maoists ' movement. In return, they would cease their violent ac * vi * es and be part of the peaceful democra * c process. This generated much hope in a country that witnessed frequent clashes between state security agencies and the Maoists that resulted in the killing of eight people each day on an average.
This new equa * on mediated by India, however, also brought in more interna * onal players in Nepal, arguably in its sole ' sphere of influence ' un * l then. The Maoists wanted a credible interna * onal agency, preferably the UN, to supervise the peace process. The media * on by India, and its lobbying with the interna * onal community, mainly the
Nepal became a ' Federal Secular Republic ' from a Unitary Hindu Kingdom, without the people- either by way of intense par @ cipatory debate or referendum- playing a decisive role.
West, forced King Gyanendra Shah to hand over power to poli * cal par * es ajer a 14-month direct rule. But in the transi * on that followed, a group of leaders, mainly the top brass of the eight par * es, began dicta * ng the future agenda more in consulta * on with interna * onal stakeholders, mainly India, and the Nepalese people and tradi * onal forces including the monarchy were gradually sidelined. The country ' s poli * cs took a rabidly radical course. Nepal became a ' Federal Secular Republic ' from a Unitary Hindu Kingdom, without the people— either by way of intense par * cipatory debate or referendum— playing a decisive role.
In November 2006, the Chairman of the Communist Party of Nepal( Maoist), Pushpa Kamal Dahal ' Prachanda ', and Nepal ' s then Prime Minister GP Koirala on behalf of the rebels and the state respec * vely, signed the Comprehensive Peace Accord. This clearly linked the peace process with the poli * cal change with an understanding that they would take place simultaneously. The UN
Mission in Nepal( UNMIN) headed by Ian Mar * n— formerly the secretary general of Amnesty Interna * onal— would supervise the elec * on to the Cons * tuent Assembly( which was tasked with the responsibility of drajing the new cons * tu * on) and act as the custodian of Maoist ' s arms and combatants, held in seven different cantonments.
Nepal became a ' Federal Secular Republic ' from a Unitary Hindu Kingdom, without the people- either by way of intense par @ cipatory debate or referendum- playing a decisive role.
However, UNMIN apparently appeared more ambi * ous. At a * me when Nepal ' s long and tradi * onal power structure was crumbling, it was only natural that the regions, ethnici * es and other communi * es that had for long felt ignored would want a place reserved for them in the future power structure. Unrest broke out in Terai and the region sought a propor * onal share in power. Terai, Nepal ' s plains areas adjacent to India, accounts for approximately 18 per cent of Nepal ' s territory and hosts nearly 50 per cent of the country ' s popula * on. UNMIN began lobbying to bring the Terai issue as well within its jurisdic * on— something that made India suspicious of its mo * ves. Evidently UNMIN did not confine its role to the leQer and spirit of the accord, and as a consequence, had to depart under pressure from Nepal, leaving the peace process incomplete, much against its wishes.
11 years ajer the peace accord was signed, the Nepalese are s * ll wondering as to whether the stated objec * ves of the coming together of the eight par * es including Maoists into the democra * c fold— peace, poli * cal stability, and economic prosperity— are within reach. The country will soon have its 11th prime minister in the past as many years; its economic growth has been stagnant at a rate of nearly two per cent; and almost all the organs of the state, including the judiciary, are packed with cadres of major poli * cal par * es, impac * ng the ins * tu * ons ' fairness,
Image 22: Voters line up to cast their ballot during Nepal’ s first ConsLtuent Assembly ElecLon, 2008
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