Knowledge Partner
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist
of Gaza once Israel withdrew, to prepare it for autonomy. Such clauses were dropped. Finally, the first Oslo Accord( Oslo I) was signed in Washington DC in September 1993.
Before the official Israeli nego * ators arrived, Norway played the role of a facilitator and ensured that it was an informal, non-threatening ambience, making it possible for the two sides to engage with each other. Retractability and avoidance of dwelling on the past helped, not to speak of the secrecy. On 18 August 1993, Norway ' s then Foreign Minister Johan Jørgen Holst spoke for eight hours on the phone with Arafat in Tunis to sort out some points. Arafat’ s lack of fluency in English must have been a disadvantage to him to him while nego * a * ng the text of the draj. Israel made it clear that Jerusalem ' s status was not nego * able. By using the words“ permanent seQlement” to be nego * ated later, Israel avoided commiqng itself to agreeing to an independent Pales * nian state. In Oslo, the PLO recognised the state of Israel and in return Israel recognised the PLO as the representa * ve of the Pales * nian people. A more unequal bargain cannot be imagined. Furthermore, while the PLO renounced‘ terrorism’, there was no reciprocal commitment by Israel though the PLO did ask for it.
The 1994 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Israel ' s then Prime Minister
Image 17: PalesLnian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, President George W. Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon aqer reading statement to the press during the closing moments of the Red Sea Summit in Aqaba, Jordan Jun 4, 2003.
The 1994 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Israel ' s then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Israel ' s then Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, and PLO ' s then Chairman Yasser Arafat. As a follow-up to Oslo I, another agreement known as Oslo II was signed in Taba, Egypt, in September 1995. In November 1995, an extremist Israeli Jew assassinated Rabin for signing the Oslo Accords, and Benjamin Netanyahu won the 1996 elec * on. That marked the burial of the Oslo Accords. Meanwhile, there is evidence that Israel tried to kill Arafat more than once.
' Postscript to Oslo’
In 2001, Norway sought a post-mortem of the talks as the peace process was stalled, and appointed Professor Hilde Henriksen Waage to find out what really happened. She was granted full access to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs( MFA) files. To her uQer surprise and shock, she found " not a single scrap of paper for the en * re period from January to September 1993— precisely the period of the backchannel talks " was available with the Norwegian MFA. All the papers were kept in the personal custody of the foreign minister and his deputy. Ajer an exhaus * ve study, Waage concluded that Norway played the role of a " helpful errand boy " for Israel, whose‘ red lines’ had been invariably respected. Norway tried to persuade the PLO of the merit of Israel’ s case, but never the other way round.
The 2000s
Here, two other media * on aQempts deserve a men * on. In July 2000, the then US President Bill Clinton presided over at Camp David nego * a * ons between Israel ' s then Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PLO ' s Chairman Arafat. The talks broke down because Israel refused to fully withdraw from the territories it captured in 1967. On Jerusalem,
By using the words“ permanent sealement” to be nego @ ated later, Israel avoided commilng itself to agreeing to an independent Pales @ nian state.
Barak was not prepared to give more than symbolic sovereignty over a part of East Jerusalem. Arafat insisted on the Right of Return of the Pales * nians who lej in 1948, but Israel placed a limit of 100,000 for family reunion. Even regarding West Bank, the Pales * nians were geqng pieces of discon * nuous territories, a " moth-eaten " West Bank, to use Pakistan ' s founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah’ s phrase, with more jus * fica * on than he ever had. In September 2000, soon ajer the talks broke down, Ariel Sharon of the Likud party, keen to sabotage any serious nego * a * ons with the Pales * nians, provoked them by visi * ng the al-Haram al-Sharif( Temple Mount for the Israelis) flanked by a thousand security men. Sharon got what he wanted and a new In * fada, known as the Al-Aqsa In * fada, began. However, Sharon failed to prevent the resump * on of talks.
During the January 2001 talks held at Taba in Sinai, Egypt, the two delega * ons made commendable progress. However, Israel was due for an elec * on and Barak had to suspend the talks. The joint statement said,“ The sides declare that they have never been closer to reaching an agreement and it is thus our shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the resump * on of nego * a * ons following the Israeli elec * ons.” Sharon won the elec * on and he was not going to talk to the
29