Knowledge Partner
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist
stated posi * on . However , the turn of events indicate a change of heart in the Indonesian government due to a variety of factors . Firstly , public pressure was building up in Australia and the government was forced to take the lead and offer to lead a mul * na * onal force in Indonesia . Given the sensi * vi * es of sovereignty , the Indonesian government may not have played ball , and were backed by the ASEAN countries in this regard . However , pressure was moun * ng inside Indonesia as well . Many countries across the world were condemning the behaviour of the Indonesian armed forces in quelling the pro-democracy and pro-independence elements , and Indonesia was under heavy financial burden with the economy in doldrums . A US decision to suspend military coopera * on was followed by the EU ' s decision of an arms embargo on Indonesia . The Indonesian government therefore “ consented ” to the deployment of the mul * lateral force under Australia , whose role was not
Another round of violence followed in 2006 . The UN Integrated Mission in East Timor ( UNMIT ) operated on a broadened mandate of capacitybuilding , restoring and maintaining public security , and enhancing a culture of democra * c governance to bring about a process of na * onal reconcilia * on and to foster social cohesion . In the aspects of security and law and order , social jus * ce , and governance ins * tu * ons and systems , persis * ng obstacles posed by states who themselves were supposed to aid this peace-building acted as impediments to East Timor achieving real self reliance ; and violence has con * nued to flare up from * me to * me .
Some * mes , governance in East Timor had been pursued on the basis of alien concepts which did not gel with the local popula * on and their tradi * ons . The UN ' s peace-building efforts will remain
Learning lessons from one event of preven @ ve diplomacy is desirable , but to try to replicate those lessons in an iden @ cal fashion in another situa @ on would be a folly .
dependent on the stances of the dominant states . The peace-building process in East Timor has demonstrated that peace growing from the soil should be encouraged ; the needs of the society should be taken into account ; there should be less of an enforced approach ; and the values of those socie * es where peace-building is taking place need to be given priority .
Finally , even though there may be similari * es , no two situa * ons are equal . Hence , learning lessons from one event of preven * ve diplomacy is desirable , but to try to replicate those lessons in an iden * cal fashion in another situa * on would be a folly . Lessons learnt may also not apply in different cultures , * me zones , circumstances or when the circumstances have changed and the world has moved on . Each event therefore deserves a unique response .
Image 15 : INTERFET Commander , Maj Gen Peter Cosgrove joins hands with the new leadership of East Timor during a celebraLon to mark the official handover from INTERFET to UNTAET . Copyright holder : Commonwealth of Australia
liked in Jakarta but was supported by the UN diplomats in New York . Hence , circumstances allowed Australia to lead the mul * lateral force at the risk of straining * es with Indonesia over the long-term , and allowing for a quick interven * on since the Australians were ready to lead in a shorter * me frame .
As far as the peace-building aspect of East Timor is concerned , this has consisted of different missions . With the UN Transi * onal Administra * on in East Timor ( UNTAET ), for the * me , a UN mission was tasked with effec * vely func * oning as a sovereign government . UNTAET saw East Timor achieve independence in 2002 as the Democra * c Republic of Timor Leste . This mission was downscaled first to the UN Mission of Support to East Timor ( UNMISET ) and then to the UN Office in Timor-Leste ( UNOTIL ).
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