Knowledge Partner
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist
stated posi * on. However, the turn of events indicate a change of heart in the Indonesian government due to a variety of factors. Firstly, public pressure was building up in Australia and the government was forced to take the lead and offer to lead a mul * na * onal force in Indonesia. Given the sensi * vi * es of sovereignty, the Indonesian government may not have played ball, and were backed by the ASEAN countries in this regard. However, pressure was moun * ng inside Indonesia as well. Many countries across the world were condemning the behaviour of the Indonesian armed forces in quelling the pro-democracy and pro-independence elements, and Indonesia was under heavy financial burden with the economy in doldrums. A US decision to suspend military coopera * on was followed by the EU ' s decision of an arms embargo on Indonesia. The Indonesian government therefore“ consented” to the deployment of the mul * lateral force under Australia, whose role was not
Another round of violence followed in 2006. The UN Integrated Mission in East Timor( UNMIT) operated on a broadened mandate of capacitybuilding, restoring and maintaining public security, and enhancing a culture of democra * c governance to bring about a process of na * onal reconcilia * on and to foster social cohesion. In the aspects of security and law and order, social jus * ce, and governance ins * tu * ons and systems, persis * ng obstacles posed by states who themselves were supposed to aid this peace-building acted as impediments to East Timor achieving real self reliance; and violence has con * nued to flare up from * me to * me.
Some * mes, governance in East Timor had been pursued on the basis of alien concepts which did not gel with the local popula * on and their tradi * ons. The UN ' s peace-building efforts will remain
Learning lessons from one event of preven @ ve diplomacy is desirable, but to try to replicate those lessons in an iden @ cal fashion in another situa @ on would be a folly.
dependent on the stances of the dominant states. The peace-building process in East Timor has demonstrated that peace growing from the soil should be encouraged; the needs of the society should be taken into account; there should be less of an enforced approach; and the values of those socie * es where peace-building is taking place need to be given priority.
Finally, even though there may be similari * es, no two situa * ons are equal. Hence, learning lessons from one event of preven * ve diplomacy is desirable, but to try to replicate those lessons in an iden * cal fashion in another situa * on would be a folly. Lessons learnt may also not apply in different cultures, * me zones, circumstances or when the circumstances have changed and the world has moved on. Each event therefore deserves a unique response.
Image 15: INTERFET Commander, Maj Gen Peter Cosgrove joins hands with the new leadership of East Timor during a celebraLon to mark the official handover from INTERFET to UNTAET. Copyright holder: Commonwealth of Australia
liked in Jakarta but was supported by the UN diplomats in New York. Hence, circumstances allowed Australia to lead the mul * lateral force at the risk of straining * es with Indonesia over the long-term, and allowing for a quick interven * on since the Australians were ready to lead in a shorter * me frame.
As far as the peace-building aspect of East Timor is concerned, this has consisted of different missions. With the UN Transi * onal Administra * on in East Timor( UNTAET), for the * me, a UN mission was tasked with effec * vely func * oning as a sovereign government. UNTAET saw East Timor achieve independence in 2002 as the Democra * c Republic of Timor Leste. This mission was downscaled first to the UN Mission of Support to East Timor( UNMISET) and then to the UN Office in Timor-Leste( UNOTIL).
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