Knowledge Partner
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist
P reven * ve Diplomacy was introduced as a concept to the world in 1992 in a report * tled An Agenda for Peace, authored by the then UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. AQen * on was turned on to the security func * on of the UN- which had long been disabled due to the Cold War- which had to be revived. In that context, preven * ve diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping became important. In 2007, the then UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon sought to improve the UN ' s preven * ve diplomacy machinery.
Ajer lessons learnt from across the world over several years of experience, it is now generally accepted that preven * ve diplomacy is successful if it manages to stop a conflict from turning violent, or if already violent, manages to stop this violence. Preven * ve diplomacy should also help in deescala * on and neutralisa * on of conflict. If one applies this principle to the
History has shown that whenever major powers take interest in a conflict, the chances of success of preven @ ve diplomacy efforts are reduced. case of East Timor, one can draw many interes * ng lessons due to the peculiar situa * on of the Asia Pacific region. Mainly, the scope of preven * ve diplomacy as seen from the prism of many countries, and certainly the Asia Pacific, was that this concept was about diplomacy, and should not be confused with preven * ve military deployments or interference in any country ' s internal affairs. In other words, the reliance of preven * ve diplomacy is seen to be on non-coercive diploma * c methods. ' Consent ' of directly involved par * es is therefore seen as essen * al.
East Timor had been added as the 27th province of Indonesia in 1975, prior to gaining independence from Portugal. In January 1999, Indonesia surprisingly announced a popular vote on the future of the territory. A UN organised referendum in August 1999 resulted in an overwhelming proindependence vote. Violence by an *-independence mili * as followed in Dili, the capital of East Timor, and the rest of the territory. The UN Security Council( UNSC)-authorised Interna * onal Force East Timor( INTERFET) was led by Australia which made Indonesia invite Southeast Asian countries too to take part in the mission. The mission was supported by the US, and was able to swijly restore order, de-escala * ng the conflict. The reasons for the success of this preven * ve diplomacy exercise were clear: limited interference by major powers, UN legi * macy, and the establishment of the INTERFET in a clear and transparent manner.
History has shown that whenever major powers take interest in a conflict, the chances of success of preven * ve diplomacy efforts are reduced. It is ojen the case that a veto power in the UNSC and the broader interests of the great powers can complicate the conflict, even though great power interest could prove beneficial in stopping violence and conflict in many cases. In the case of East Timor, the Associa * on of Southeast Asian Na * ons( ASEAN) could have played a role, but was not seen as a neutral party given the Indonesia ' s involvement as a party to the conflict. The UN or INTERFET
force was viewed as a legi * mate actor as compared to ASEAN because it was perceived as being more neutral. INTERFET was aided by the fact that the objec * ves were clear from the b e g i n n i n g.“ A l l n e c e s s a r y measures” were to be taken to“ restore peace and security in East Timor, protect and support the mission in East Timor, and f a c i l i t a t e h u m a n i t a r i a n
The UN or INTERFET force was viewed as a legi @ mate actor as compared to ASEAN because it was perceived as being more neutral. INTERFET was aided by the fact that the objec @ ves were clear from the beginning.
assistance.” Thus the mandate was rela * vely simple and clear. Indonesia also became a willing partner in restoring law and order in East Timor.
However, it can be argued that ASEAN could have handled the issue at the regional level, thereby elimina * ng the need for the UN to intervene under Chapter VII, which had caught on as a concept during this phase of the UN ' s func * oning. Doing so would have allowed Indonesia to have a greater say in the end of the conflict, but may have perhaps allowed the conflict to linger on, and beyond desirable limits. One must remember that Rwanda and Srebrenica had just taken place; and many UN member states as well as the UN Secretary General were concerned that violence could spread and create a humanitarian and security crisis on the scale witnessed in the Balkans. Indonesia ' s willingness to accept an interna * onal force came about due to the pressure the interna * onal community was able to apply on it, which was elusive earlier on, and could have prevented the escala * on of violence. Indonesia succumbed due to pressures— financial, military and economic boycoQ and the moral responsibility of being seen as an interna * onal pariah. Another interes * ng
Image 13: Ballot papers being transported for the independence referendum in East Timor in 1999
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