Knowledge Partner
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist
C
olombia, a tourist paradise stretching from the South American jungles
*ll the shores of the Caribbean Sea, seems an unlikely laboratory for
proletarian revolu*on. For the last six decades, it has been tortured by
the conflic*ng ideologies of Lej and Right. The 1948 assassina*on of
popular radical lejist leader and candidate for presidency, Jorge Eliécer
Gaitán, resulted in bloody civil strife that wracked Colombia for 10 years.
The Lej, persecuted by the establishment, regrouped in guerrilla
movements.
The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo
(Revolu*onary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army) (FARC–EP/
FARC), La*n America’s oldest, largest and best equipped insurgency of
Marxist origin, was formed in the early 1960s under the leadership of
Manuel Marulanda Velez, who in 1961 declared an independent “Republic of
Marquetalia” within Colombian territory. By 1982, FARC cadres numbered
several thousand, reputed to be living off the drug trade.
Image 10: Colombians marching for the freedom of the people kidnapped by the
FARC and the ELN
One important
feature of the
agreement related to
collabora@on by the
FARC in eradica@ng
drug trafficking.
Rich landholders, with the blessings of
successive Colombian governments, formed
armed paramilitary forces for protec*on.
These in *me morphed into gangs involved in
drug-trafficking and kidnapping. AQempts by
successive presidents — Belisario Betancur in
1982, Cesar Gaviria in 1990, Ernesto Samper
in 1994, and Andres Pastrana in 1999 —
failed to come to a las*ng seQlement. By
2002, FARC had been granted a safe haven of 42,000 sq km, roughly the
size of Switzerland, controlled by around 20,000 armed fighters. It carried
out high profile kidnappings, assassina*ons of poli*cal figures and soldiers,
and aQacks on civil and military targets. The guerrillas took advantage of
porous borders with neighbouring Ecuador and Venezuela to evade capture
and maintain supply lines.
of arms by militants, and compensa*on to vic*ms. Four years later, in
October 2016, La*n American leaders, accompanied by the UN secretary
general, applauded as President Santos signed an agreement with FARC
leader Rodrigo Londoño 'Timochenko' to end the civil war that had
resulted in over 250,000 deaths and had lej millions of Colombians
displaced.
The poli*cal consensus behind the peace process remains fragile. A
significant number of Colombians, and the right wing poli*cal forces
spearheaded by former President
Alvaro Uribe, were cri*cal of the
pact for being too lenient on FARC Poli@cal ramifica@ons will
rebels by allowing them to re- include the strengthening
integrate into society, form a poli*cal of lei-wing par@es, with
party, make minimal repara*ons and
an injec@on of
escape jail sentences. Santos,
confident of having scored an demobilised guerrillas,
undeniable success, submiQed the and their claims of
agreement to a na*onal referendum. vindica@on.
The vote went narrowly against the
agreement and Santos had to save poli*cal face – and the accord – by
having a slightly amended text passed weeks later by the Colombian
Congress. Today, the FARC is a purely poli*cal movement and will fight
elec*ons to the Congress, where they have a few reserved seats.
The US was deeply involved in subver*ng lej-wing regimes in La*n
America. Colombia was as an important ally. In 2000, the Clinton
administra*on offered Plan Colombia, which provided that country hundreds
of millions of dollars annually, ostensibly to fight drug trade. The Colombian
armed forces, the main recipients of US largesse, became and remain one of
the most potent in the region. Despite this, the deadly stalemate con*nued
*ll Juan Manuel Santos became Colombia's president in 2010 and opened
direct talks with the FARC, in August 2012 in Cuba.
With diploma*c and poli*cal backing from Chile, Venezuela, Norway and the
blessings of the US, preliminary talks were held in Oslo in October 2012 and
in Havana thereajer. The FARC demands included agrarian reform, changes
in the na*on’s economic model, free trade deals, and trials for military war
crimes. The Colombian government refused to halt its military campaign
against the guerrillas and claimed its economic model was not nego*able. It
also included in the agenda the narco*cs trade, surrender and laying down
One important feature of the agreement related to collabora*on by the
FARC in eradica*ng drug trafficking. According to the UN, the area under
cocaine cul*va*on in Colombia has expanded massively in recent years.
The FARC commiQed to give up its narco*cs ac*vity and collaborate with
government authori*es to make sure that this menace would at least be
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