dig.ni.fy Winter Issue - January 2025 | Page 68

of time, both to do the research, produce the material, and engage the constituencies – such is the acknowledgement that the target for a visioning document is 2030. During that time, a lot of damage can be done to the institutions designed to protect people in general and the vulnerable in particular.

A more practical solution would be to start thinking and acting strategically – in the short-term, the mid-term, and the longer-term – to address fundamental flaws in the design of the American Republic, to rebuild communities and senses of trust, and to rethink frameworks and systems that would more properly reflect a more inclusive democracy. Thinking and acting in this way, responses could start now and build for the future.

Short-Term Strategy: Addressing Fundamental Flaws

We have discussed the purpose behind certain designs of the Founding Fathers – namely, the Electoral College and the U.S. Supreme Court – which we found to be inherently undemocratic. We examined what caused the general distrust of American institutions – namely, actions of the U.S. Supreme Court, Congress, and the two-party system – which we found to further divide people along lines of race, gender, and wealth. And we analyzed the causes underpinning the rise of populism – namely, fear, alienation, and grievances – which coalesced around certain personality traits and the personhood of Donald Trump.

In thinking strategically about addressing reform in these areas, it is reasonable to assume it would be unwise to expend any energy on eliminating or bypassing the Electoral College, reforming the U.S. Supreme Court through term limits, or attempting to overturn Citizens United to reduce the influence of money in politics. Until there is a change in control of the presidency, Congress, and the Supreme Court, reform is not and will not be possible as vested interests owe their power to existing structures. As such, any time spent on these unwinnable campaigns would take time away from more productive initiatives.

What could be an effective strategy is to design means for reform that would appeal to the 70 percent of registered voters – both Democrats and members of other parties – who did not vote for Trump. The previously discussed four-step program for combating the rise of populism would be helpful in this regard – particularly, correcting the framing on which today’s populism is based.

In the first instance, this would require developing a better communications strategy that would put pressure upon Democrats who remain in office to hold them accountable for the results of the election. It is not enough simply for the Democrats to circle the wagons and conduct an internal review, which more often than not would simply place the blame on others or suggest reforms that would benefit the party leadership and/or any heir apparent, as has already started with Pelosi reversing position to shift the blame for the Democrats loss on Biden’s late decision to resign which eliminated the opportunity for a primary and elevation of Harris by default. Equally, Democrats cannot simply assume that things will be different after a second Trump term. Trump may make a run at a third term, or his heir apparent may well carry on the tradition.

A part of this strategy would be to articulate the real reasons for the Democrat’s loss, many of which have been discussed above. In the least, it should emphasize the arrogance that assumed certain blocks of voters would vote for the Democrats by default. But more importantly, it would deconstruct the real issues that could then be used to achieve success in the midterms.

Another part of the strategy would be to reach across the aisle to more moderate Republicans who, with Trump being successfully reelected, will now turn their attention to their own reelection. Placing constituent needs (and their reelection) above the false mandate that Trump uses to push forward his personal agenda, Republicans could align with Democrats to

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