Digital Continent Summer 2017 | Page 36

27 foundation of common, “lived” experience – I lay down to sleep, then I wake up, and I, upon self- reflection, sense no difference in my person. Dreamless sleepers remain human persons, despite their dreamless sleep. The only reasonable assumption we can make is that substantial being cannot come and go as purely subjective experiences, else we damage the concept of personhood entirely. 98 This insight makes possible the presence of personal being in the human zygote well before the awakening of personal subjectivity. 99 It seems to be that the zygote and the adult human body are the same living being, differing merely at the stage of development. This appears to justify believing the zygote a human person. 100 Crosby notes a possible objection, an ironically Aristotelian objection: how can we argue for the personhood of a single zygote, which may divide into two separate bodies through a process called twinning? Crosby, as devil’s advocate, argues that this instability in the zygote threatens the incommunicability of personhood – incommunicability referring to the absolute and unrepeatable value of a particular human being as a human person. 101 Incommunicability arises from the stability of a particular person, insomuch as a particular person is itself without any confusion to possibly being someone else. Is not the zygote, with this understanding in mind, unsuitable to be considered a discrete, personal body, since it retains a high potential for divisibility? 102 In other words, only with a greater individuality – a stronger claim that this body (zygote) is a particular person’s body – does the zygote itself become “matter capable of being informed by a personal soul.” 103 John Crosby responds that even adult human beings “lag behind the person with respect to indivisibility.” 104 For example, siamese twins may appear to share a body, he argues, but we nevertheless intuit their discrete personhood. 105 The fact that human bodies can be genetically copied does not interfere with personhood, because a person is more than a mere body. Persons live through their bodies and through their minds. The issue here appears to be more an issue of ensoulment than an issue of personhood, and this ensoulment issue has, at most, partial bearing on the issue of personhood. The ensoulment problem changes no asp