Digital Continent Summer 2017 | Page 33

24 significant role in this philosophical biology. Preservation of being physically manifests as metabolism, and Jonas reasonably demonstrates this point; therefore, functional concepts inherent to the human body represent ontological activities manifested through biology. In this way the human body does not cage the human spirit, because the body acts as an extension of the human person as a whole living being. A telos cannot be a mere abstraction. In a talk titled, “From Love, By Love, For Love”, Fr. Michael Schmitz boldly claimed that “we are our bodies.” 90 Though an oversimplification, I believe he correctly meant, “We cannot be human beings without our physical bodies.” This concept of bodily importance accords with the personalistic hylomorphism advanced by William Fey, O.F.M., in his essay, “Taking Seriously Our Bodily Being” – I am a human person who does mental and bodily things. 91 This hylomorphic theory certainly provides a stronger argument compared with an appeal to a brute fact (if I interpret stronger to mean more refined), though it is nevertheless unnecessary as a basic argument, as attested by Jonas’ philosophical biology. But philosophical biology is not the only non-Aristotelian defense of bodily importance. The common human experience of growth and development also proves the significance of the human body. The principle of bodily development provides a sufficient account of how the physical body belongs to the human person. Where else than in the development of my body do I experience the profound intimacy of functional concepts? 90 Michael Schmitz, “From Love, By Love, For Love: A Deeper Understanding of Contraception, Same-sex Attraction, and Authentic Love” (Catholic Lighthouse Media, 2012). 91 William Fey, O.F.M, “Taking Seriously Our Bodily Being,” Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 4, no.4 (2001): 136.