6
identity are not the same”, a common statement by those who do not want gender to be equated with
sex. 11 Nutt claims, implicitly, that “lived” truth of oneself does not reduce to biology. Though Nutt is a
journalist and not a scholar, such a claim cannot be disregarded lightly. Even if a rigid sexual binary were
real and meaningful, many people still perceive themselves as “living” outside this binary, and not
having chosen to do so. The number of people living outside this binary is not a marginal number, as
evident by the multitude of people legally and publically involved in the controversial bathroom bills
legislation. When Judith Butler rightly said, “What makes for a livable world is no idle question. It is not
merely a question for philosophers,” 12 she articulated a point often lost on critics of liberal gender
theories. Even if the sexual binary is correct, telling transgender persons that their experiences
contradict reality does not solve the problem. The once marginal issue of gender has transformed into a
significant social issue, a social issue ripe and ready to become a social crisis, if it is not already. The fact
remains that some people experience themselves to be radically other than their bodies, and this
experience contains great meaning for them. In this experience, the presence or absence of a penis or
vagina can be terribly painful, because it contradicts the “felt” experience of oneself.
How are we to make sense of this “lived” divide, this “felt” incongruence? Nutt writes about the
brain and body (de-emphasizing genital significance) as two different aspects of what it means to be a
human person, and that our gender identity is in itself a brain process. 13 Fausto-Sterling would argue the
validity of this point, but also its over-simplification of the matter. 14 Scientists still do not understand
fully the relationship between consciousness, brain processes, and self. Gender, then, remains
profoundly mysterious, even if reduced to a brain process. Despite this difficulty, people distinguish
between mind and body by “living” the difference and “living” the mystery: this body is my body. Nutt,
despite ambiguities in her writing, appears to hold this view as well. Once again, this body and my body
are not always the same “felt” experience, due to “felt” incongruence: “Nicole knew that she was more
than the sum of her parts – that her heart or mind defined who she was, but her body gave her
context…. Nicole finally needed to make that connection right.” 15 The only way to make sense of this
“felt” incongruence, then, is to prioritize my body above this body.
Judith Butler contextualizes this problem of “felt” incongruence with the concept of human
dignity as a “lived” experience. Once again, she rightly asks: “What is and is not livable?” 16 She asks this
question while envisioning gender as a social issue of dignity and rights, as a struggle of transgender
11
Ibid, 89.
Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York: Routledge, 2004), 17.
13
Amy Ellis Nutt, Becoming Nicole: The Transformation of an American Family (New York: Random House, 2015).
There is a deeper philosophical problem at work here that cannot be explored, because it goes well beyond the
topic at hand. This topic includes the metaphysical relationship between consciousness, gender, and the body, and
ultimately how the brain fits into that relationship.
14
Anne Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the construction of Sexuality (New York: Basic Books,
2000), Chapter Five – “Sexing the Brain”.
15
Ibid, 252.
16
Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York: Routledge, 2004), 30.
12