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contradiction, because it implies that God could know more than He does. 142 Therefore, Gutberlet argues that “whenever a potential infinite is assumed, an actual infinite of the same sort must be assumed for the mind does not create this new extension, but recognizes it as objectively possible.” 143 However, the actual infinite, in Gutberlet’s view, exists in the world of the intelligible but not the real beings. For Cantor, an actual infinite existing in reality presents no problem. In fact, Cantor argues for the possibility of the actual infinity of individual created beings in any extended part of space. 144 Somewhat surprisingly, Cantor is firmly opposed to the idea of an infinite past, calling it a “monstrous absurdity.” 145 Cantor, like Bonaventure, finds the idea of an infinite elapsed time philosophically incoherent. While Cantor was convinced that mathematics alone was not capable of proving the necessity of the temporal beginning of creation, he was convinced that a mixed mathematical-metaphysical proof could be given. However, despite his firm conviction and an ongoing engagement both mathematical and philosophical study of infinity, Cantor never developed an argument demonstrating the necessity of the temporal beginning of the world. 142 Small, "Cantor and the Scholastics," 418. Ibid, 419. 144 Ibid, 409. 145 Ibid, 410. 143 Page 57 of 62