ESSAY 5
system functioned well, raising concerns in August 2010 and again in November 2010. A Dangerous Delay argues that humanitarian relief would have done
more good if donors and relief organizations had thought in terms of the likelihood and severity of a crisis (as the homeowner mentioned earlier did when
considering gutter repairs).
“It would have been clear from around January 2011,” the report says, “that
the high probability of poor March–May rains in the Horn of Africa, magnified
by the failure of the previous rains in late 2010, would constitute a critical risk.”
Southern Somalia exceeded the U.N. trigger for emergency action—a malnutrition rate of 15 percent—in August 2010, when malnutrition reached 16
percent. By January 2011, it was 25 percent. But funding for relief did not rise
significantly until August 2011, once famine was declared.
As the saying goes, “Hindsight is 20/20.” Donors may have worried that
releasing emergency funding unnecessarily or prematurely would be worse.
(“What if it’s not as bad as they say, and we look like we’re wasting money?”
Or: “What if we spend the money, and later there’s a real emergency?”). Decision makers should carefully weigh the details of the early warnings, and the
potential consequences of not sending help in time, against these concerns.
As the Dangerous Delay report points out, record high malnutrition rates
are not the early warning. They are the disaster itself. Not responding quickly
means the costs are largely borne by children under 2, since even short periods
of malnutrition can cause them long-term damage.
Where Prevention Really Starts
Southern Somalia had an acute malnutrition rate of 16 percent—higher
among young children—“before” the crisis, when no one was calling the
situation an emergency. Everyday life is perilous for most Somalis. In richer
countries, we often consider disasters an exception to normal life. A “state of
emergency” is declared, help is rushed in, and we expect that, even after major
disasters such as Hurricane Sandy in 2012, things will return to normal.
In poor countries, where the lines are far more blurred, thinking of hunger
caused by “disaster” as separate from “normal,” everyday hunger may interfere
with the search for lasting solutions. After all, airlifts of emergency supplies
won’t continue indefinitely, but cycles of “disaster” and “normal” may, particularly given climate change.
What’s needed, but not yet in place, is a bridge between assistance for
emergencies and sustainable development. U.S. development assistance
should focus on enabling poor communities to build resilience—equipping
and supporting them to develop strategies to cope with the many factors beyond their control. Greater resilience is urgent now and will only grow more
urgent. USAID took an important step forward in December 2012 with the
launch of its first-ever Resiliency Policy.
Resilience can, in fact, be built. Ethiopia is Somalia’s neighbor and its
people also suffered greatly during the 2011 drought. But because “building resilience” was already under way, Ethiopian children did not die by the
thousands, and far fewer people needed emergency aid than during the previous drought.
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Myths
Realities
Myth: Not much can be done
to improve child nutrition without
money—a lot of it.
Reality: For about $8, a child
can be provided with a package of
nutrients and medications designed
to help prevent irreversible damage
from malnutrition. Thus, the United
States helps large numbers of children
even with our current modest nutrition
assistance budget (about $95 million
a year).
Nutrition during the 1,000-day window
is in the category of “things it’s too
expensive not to do,” since it can cost
a country as much as 11 percent of
its economic output in lost productivity, not to mention significant extra
healthcare costs.
Realizing how critical early nutrition
is, national governments are the main
investors in SUN countries’ nutrition
initiatives. Ghana, Nepal, and Tanzania, for example, have tripled national
resources dedicated to nutrition.
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Myth: There’s nothing we can do
to prevent famine. It’s been happening
for thousands of years.
Reality: Drought, hurricanes, and
the like are natural phenomena. People
cannot prevent or control them.
Famine in the 21st century is a human
failure. It happens simply because
people who need help do not receive
it in time.
In many instances, prevention is far
less costly than post-famine recovery efforts. In Ethiopia, for example,
studies showed that restocking sheep
and goats cost at least 6 times more
than providing food for animals so
they could survive drought. Restocking cattle cost 14 times more than
supplementary feeding.
www.bread.org/institute
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Development Works 31