Jonathan once said that some members of Boko Haram live and dine with him in Nigeria's seat of government, the Aso Villa. This means that President Jonathan is either sympathetic to one or more cells of Boko Haram or that he is a hostage of the intrigues and blackmail manufactured and traded by these criminal cells to manoeuvre and manipulate for the survival of the structures that support their existence. One of the survival tactics is to pool political resources, in monetary, logistics and other technical terms, to sponsor candidates who, in turn, execute their criminal biddings once installed.
Furthermore, these criminal cells can manipulate the outcomes of elections through outright rigging and falsifications of documents and election results so as to obtain blackmail tools with which to muzzle politicians. These cells are so cunning and dangerous that it may sometimes be difficult to say if a politician is really sympathetic to their cause or is a hostage of their trap. This is one of the factors which make the issue of Boko Haram thorny and difficult to handle. The other thorny factor is the multiplicity of Boko Haram cells, with each cell having its own criminal cause, ambition and target, which makes it difficult to negotiate with the group and reach an understanding.
Some school of thought think that it is even wrong to negotiate with groups like Boko Haram. "How can you negotiate with the perpetuity of crime hoisted on the flagstaff of a criminal gang - a gang that feasts on crime as its ideological base-rock?" asked a serving military officer who prefers anonymity. "Allow the politicians to their politicking and then let the military do its primary and conventional job of protecting our national and territorial integrity as well as maintaining our national security. We agree to subordinate ourselves and the military institution to the civilian administration of the nation. But that should purely be administrative. No civilian should tell us the type of weapons to buy, or manufacture, and stock, or to dictate to us where to fire which salvo or torpedo. This is the problem we are having now, and this is why the military aspect of fighting Boko Haram is suffering a serious setback. But, we will triumph, soon, when we regain our technical and professional independence from the politicians. Let them serve as our administrative bosses. Period!"
The Nigerian Army: Loyal and patriotic. Will fight Boko Haram more effectively if professional independence is given by the political class.
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