By opening fire at workers ’ meetings and organising a coup , Chiang Kai-shek as though said in reply to the appeal of the imperialists that he was prepared to enter into a compromise with imperialists along with the national bourgeoisie against the workers and peasants of China .
III The Second Stage of the Chinese Revolution
The coup of Chiang Kai-shek marks the departure of the national bourgeoisie from the revolution , the birth of a centre of national counterrevolution and a deal by the Right-wing Kuomintang elements with imperialism against the Chinese Revolution .
Chiang Kai-shek ’ s coup signifies that in South China there will be henceforth two camps , two governments , two armies , two centres — the centre of revolution in Wuhan and the centre of counter-revolution in Nanking .
Chiang Kai-shek ’ s coup signifies that the revolution has entered the second stage of its development , that the turn has commenced from a revolution of a general and united national front to a revolution of the many millions of workers and peasants , to an agrarian revolution , which is intensifying and extending the struggle against imperialism , against the gentry and the feudal landlords ; against the militarists and the counter-revolutionary group of Chiang Kai-shek .
This means that the struggle between the two paths of revolution , between the adherents of its further development and the adherents of its liquidation , will become sharper from day to day , and cover the entire present period of revolution .
This means that the revolutionary Kuomintang in Wuhan , by waging a resolute struggle against militarism and imperialism , will be converted in practice into an organ of the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry and the counter-revolutionary group of Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking , by breaking away from the workers and
16 peasants and making a rapprochement with imperialism will share finally the fate of the militarists .
But from this it follows that the policy of preserving the unity of the Kuomintang , the policy of isolating the Right-wing elements within the Kuomintang and utilising them for the aims of the revolution has already ceased to correspond to the new tasks of the revolution . This policy must be substituted by a policy of a resolute expulsion of the Right-wing elements from the Kuomintang , a policy of a determined struggle against them down to their complete political elimination , a policy of concentrating the entire power in the country in the hands of the revolutionary Kuomintang , the Kuomintang without its Right-wing elements and the Kuomintang as a bloc of the Left-wing Kuomintang elements and the Communists .
From this it follows further that the policy of close cooperation of the Left-wing elements and the Communists within the Kuomintang assumes a special force and a special importance at the present stage , that this cooperation reflects the alliance of the workers and peasants formed outside the Kuomintang , and that without such a cooperation , the victory of the revolution is impossible . From this it follows further that the main source of the force of the revolutionary Kuomintang is the further unfolding of the revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants and the consolidation of their mass organisations — the revolutionary peasant committees , trade unions of workers and other mass revolutionary organisations as preparatory elements of the Soviets in the future , that the main guarantee of the victory of the revolution is the growth of the revolutionary activity of the millions of toiling masses and the main antidote against counter-revolution — the arming of workers and peasants .
Finally , from this follows that while fighting shoulder to shoulder with the revolutionary Kuomintang elements , the Communist Party must more than ever before retain its independence , as a condition necessary for ensuring the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeoisdemocratic revolution .
IV The Mistakes of the Opposition
The fundamental mistake of the Opposition ( Radek and Co .) consists in not understanding the character of the revolution in China , in not understanding which is the stage that the revolution is passing through at the present time , and in not understanding its present international set up .
The Opposition demands that the Chinese Revolution should develop at approximately the same speed as the October Revolution did . The Opposition is dissatisfied that the Shanghai workers did not take up a resolute fight against the imperialists and their myrmidons .
But it does not understand that the revolution in China cannot develop with a rapid speed because among other things , the international situation at present is less favourable than in 1917 ( there is no war between the imperialists ).
It does not understand that one must not wage a decisive battle under unfavourable conditions , when the reserves are still not drawn in , just as the Bolsheviks , for instance , did not take up decisive battles either in April or in July 1917 .
The Opposition does not understand that not to avoid a decisive battle under unfavourable conditions ( when it can be avoided ) means facilitating the cause of the enemies of the revolution .
The Opposition demands the immediate formation of Soviets of Workers ’ and Peasants ’ and Soldiers ’ Deputies in China . But what does the formation of Soviets now signify ?
In the first place , Soviets cannot be formed at any moment ; they are formed only in the period of a special upsurge of the revolutionary wave .
Secondly , Soviets are not formed for babble , they are primarily formed as organs of struggle against the existing power , as organs of
Class Struggle