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Changing the Constitution
sibly only a minority of the population, from ‘‘ganging up’’ on a minority
of the States, with possibly a majority of the population. The arrangement agreed upon offers some assurance that public support for change
will be strong and deliberate, and that it will be based on a national
rather than a regional consensus. In these respects, the method of amendment is analogous to the Electoral College system, which encourages
presidential candidates to campaign nationally and construct a national
consensus in the race for the presidency.
Third, the method for amending the Constitution acknowledges the
sovereignty of the States and strengthens the principle of federalism. If
there is to be a formal change of the system, the States play a commanding role. In fact, they have the last word and in this respect exercise sovereignty over the nation. If Congress chooses not to propose an amendment, the States may even initiate an amendment of their own by the
convention method, ratify it on their own authority, and circumvent the
Congress.
Every amendment that has been added thus far, however, was proposed by Congress, and the States have never taken advantage of the
convention option. The Constitution asserts that, in the event the States
call for a convention, Congress ‘‘shall’’ comply. But as a practical matter
there is no way to force Congress to act, and it would seem in this instance—as in many others—that the Framers relied upon the good faith
of Congress for the observance of this requirement. If Congress were to
call a convention, it would be appropriate for Congress to enact legislation providing for the organization and procedure of a convention—a
step the Congress has yet to take.
Because the Constitution sets forth no rules or standards for the conduct of such a convention, there is some uncertainty about its possible
composition and scope of authority. Some observers wary of the convention method have argued that it is a risky alternative because such a convention, once called, might become a ‘‘runaway’’ assembly bent upon rewriting the entire Constitution. Others contend, however, that this is a
phantom danger because Congress would insist upon instructing the
delegates to limit their consideration to a single amendment proposal
and would be free to reject other amendments that might arise from the
convention. In other words, the chance of a ‘‘runaway’’ convention is