Washington’s Farewell Address
541
ments occasionally riot and insurrection. It opens the doors to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access to the Government
itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and the will
of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another.
There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks
upon the administration of the Government, and serve to keep alive the
spirit of liberty. This within certain limits is probably true; and in governments of a monarchical cast, patriotism may look with indulgence, if not
with favor, upon the spirit of party. But in those of the popular character,
in governments purely elective, it is a spirit not to be encouraged. From
their natural tendency, it is certain there will always be enough of that
spirit for every salutary purpose. And, there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, lest, instead of warming, it should consume.
It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free country
should inspire caution in those entrusted with its administration, to confine themselves within their respective constitutional spheres, avoiding
in the exercise of the powers of one department to encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all
the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just estimate of that love of power, and proneness to abuse it, which predominates in the human heart, is sufficient to
satisfy us of the truth of this position. The necessity of reciprocal checks
in the exercise of political power, by dividing and distributing it into different depositories, and constituting each the guardian of the public weal
against invasions by the others, has been evinced by experiments ancient
and modern, some of them in our country and under our own eyes. To
preserve them must be as necessary as to institute them. If, in the opinion
of the people, the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the
way which the Constitution designates. But let there be no change by
usurpation; for, though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of
good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent
evil any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time yield.—