Principles of Statutory Construction
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mental policy of all governments’’ is ‘‘to exclude foreign influence from
their executive councils.’’ This, he observed, ‘‘cuts off all chances for ambitious foreigners, who might otherwise be intriguing for the office; and
interposes a barrier against those corrupt interferences of foreign governments in executive elections, which have inflicted the most serious evils
upon the elective monarchies of Europe.’’ It was thought dangerous, in
other words, to make the presidency available to a person who might
have just recently come to the United States and might still feel an allegiance to a king, a czar, or a foreign government. In light of these considerations, a ruling that George Romney, born of American parents, was a
‘‘natural born’’ citizen would seem to be consistent with the basic purpose of the eligibility clause.
A more troublesome interpretive problem arises when, even though
the words are clear of doubt, the constitutional provision in which they
appear is not entirely free of ambiguity. Consider, for example, Article II,
Section 2, which provides that the President shall have the power to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States established by
law. We know from Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution that judges
of the Supreme Court shall hold their office ‘‘during good behavior,’’ and
cannot be removed from office by the President. But what about an ambassador or a department head? The Constitution is silent on the question
of whether the President may remove one of these officials from office. Yet
it would seem to follow, as a matter of common sense, that if the President
has the power to appoint an ambassador that he also has the power to remove him, and that the removal power is therefore incidental to the appointment power. This is precisely how the Supreme Court has resolved
the question. The removal power may be said to be, in effect, an implied
power of the President, and one that is essential if the President is to be
able to carry out the executive functions. It hardly makes sense to deny the
President this power and at the same time expect him to administer the
laws and conduct the foreign relations of the country. Otherwise the President would be at the mercy of his own cabinet and foreign ambassadors.
Granted, then, that the President may remove these officers, might the
Senate nevertheless limit the President’s removal power either by requiring its own consent or by specifying the causes for the removal? The Sen-