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Interpreting and Preserving the Constitution
ment, this was also a significant contribution to understanding the role
of the judge in the American political system.
Borrowing heavily from Blackstone, but finding support as well from
such noted authorities as Bacon and Vattel, Story affirmed Blackstone’s
first rule of interpretation: to construe the instrument ‘‘according to the
sense of the terms and the intentions of the parties.’’ Continuing, Story
laid out the rule as follows:
Mr. Justice Blackstone has remarked that the intention of a law is to be
gathered from the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and
consequence, or the reason and spirit of the law. He goes on to justify
the remark by stating, that words are generally to be understood in their
usual and most known signification, not so much regarding the propriety of grammar as their general and popular use; that if words happen
to be dubious, their meaning may be established by the context, or by
comparing them with other words and sentences in the same instrument; that illustrations may be further derived from the subject matter,
with reference to which the expressions are used; that the effect and consequence of a particular construction is to be examined because, if a literal meaning would involve a manifest absurdity, it ought not to be
adopted; and that the reason and spirit of the law, or the causes which
led to its enactment, are often the best exponents of the words, and limit
their application.
From this it followed, said Story, that in many instances there is no
problem of interpretation unless ‘‘there is some ambiguity or doubt’’
about the meaning of a particular word or phrase. ‘‘Where the words are
plain and clear, and the sense distinct and perfect arising from them, there
is generally no necessity to have recourse to other means of interpretation.’’ In this situation, the instrument in question, whether it be a contract,
a will, a statute, or the Constitution, is said to interpret itself, and the judge
has only to acknowledge and declare the obvious intent of the parties.
Applying these principles to the interpretation of the Constitution,
Story asserted that the first rule is to examine both the general structure
and the component parts of the Constitution, keeping in mind its overall
objectives and scope of power. ‘‘Where the words are plain, clear, and determinate, they require no interpretation.’’ This is true of most provisions