Principles of Statutory Construction
467
ished with the utmost severity’’ should ‘‘not extend to the surgeon who
opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street with a fit.’’
Finally, wrote Blackstone, judges should consider the reason and spirit
of the law when the words are dubious and the alternative means of construction have failed to uncover the intent of the lawmakers. To illustrate
the point, he cited a case from the Roman law put by Cicero, the great
statesman and orator. There was a law for ancient mariners providing
that anyone who abandoned ship in a storm forfeited all of his personal
property on board. Those who stayed with the ship were entitled to keep
both the ship and its cargo. The intent of the law, obviously, was to encourage seamen to remain with a stricken vessel by offering them an economic incentive and to reduce the loss of valuable ships. A terrible storm
arose, and every sailor except one who was too sick to move left the
ship in question. The ship miraculously survived the storm, and when
it reached port the sick man claimed ownership of the ship and its contents. The Roman judges properly rejected his claim because a reward to
him, though technically correct, would defeat the intent of the law.
This method of interpreting the law according to its reason arises from
what we call equity, which, as we saw earlier, is an interpretive device
used by judges to correct a law which, because of its generality and universality, may be deficient when applied. But equity jurisprudence, as
Blackstone further explained, is potentially dangerous to rule of law and
must be applied with utmost caution. This is so because equity depends
essentially upon the particular circumstances of each individual case,
and the established rules are not as definite as in the law. Carried to extremes, it would make the judges a law unto themselves. ‘‘The liberty of
considering all cases in an equitable light,’’ he warned, ‘‘must not be indulged too far, lest thereby we destroy all law, and leave the decision of
every question entirely in the breast of the judge. And law, without equity, though hard and disagreeable, is much more desirable for the public
good than equity without law, which would make every judge a legislator, and introduce most infinite confusion; as there would be almost as
many different rules of action laid down in our courts, as there are differences of capacity and sentiment in the human mind.’’
In 1803, the first American edition of Blackstone was published in
Philadelphia by St. George Tucker, a professor of law at William and