Congress Is Not an Oligarchy
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would render superfluous the specific enumeration of other Congressional powers.
It was true, of course, that the Framers had placed no limit on the
amount that might be taxed. It would not be practical, the Federalists
believed, to do so. In time of war and national emergencies, suggested
Hamilton in Federalist 34, the situation might call for added revenue.
‘‘Constitutions of civil government are not to be framed upon a calculation of existing emergencies. . . . There ought to be a capacity to provide
for future contingencies, as these may happen; and, as these are illimitable in their nature, it is impossible safely to limit that capacity.’’ Given the
various constitutional restraints on government and the system of popular control over members of Congress, abuses of the tax power thus
seemed remote.
Similarly unwarranted, argued Publius, were Anti-Federalist assaults
on the Necessary and Proper and Supremacy clauses. ‘‘These two clauses,’’
observed Hamilton in Federalist 33, ‘‘have been sources of much virulent
invective and petulant declamation. . . . [and] have been held up to the
people, in all the exaggerated colors of misrepresentation, as the pernicious engines by which their local governments were to be destroyed and
their liberties exterminated.’’ Upon close examination, however, it was
clear that both clauses were ‘‘perfectly harmless.’’ Indeed, wrote Hamilton, ‘‘the constitutional operation of the intended government would be
precisely the same, if these clauses were entirely obliterated. . . . They are
only declaratory of a truth, which would have resulted by necessary and
unavoidable implication from the very act of constituting a Federal government, and vesting it with certain specified powers.’’ By this he meant
that the Necessary and Proper clause was intended ‘‘to leave nothing to
construction’’ and to remove all doubt that the delegation of certain powers to Congress carried with it the implied right to execute those powers
by necessary and proper laws; and that the Supremacy Clause simply acknowledged the fact that ‘‘a law by the very meaning of the term includes supremacy.’’ The supremacy of national laws ‘‘flows immediately
and necessarily from the institution of a Federal government.’’ The States
were protected by language which ‘‘expressly confines this supremacy to
laws made pursuant to the Constitution.’’