The Benefits of Compromise
267
legislatures; and the Articles of Confederation had vested all executive
power in a unicameral Congress. Experience had shown, however, that
many of these State legislatures had acted without restraint and abused
their power, and that certain executive functions should not be conferred on a legislative body. There was therefore considerable support
for the establishment of a reasonably powerful executive to check the
legislature.
The New York constitution offered a better guide than the Virginia
Plan and served as a point of departure. It provided for the election of a
governor by the people, who was thus independent of the legislature.
His term was three years and he was indefinitely re-eligible. Except for
his power to appoint and veto laws proposed by the legislature, he did
not need the approval of another body to carry out the executive function. He was in charge of the militia, possessed the pardoning power, and
was empowered to execute the laws. In Federalist No. 69, Hamilton later
observed the similarities and differences between the President and the
New York governor.
When the executive portion of the Virginia Plan was taken up on
June 1, James Wilson of Pennsylvania moved that the executive should
consist of a single person. He argued in favor of a strong executive—
elected by the people, and free of dependence on the legislature as well
as the States. Wilson also wanted an executive who was empowered to
veto legislation (in concurrence with a council of revision) and was eligible for re-election indefinitely. The great requisites of the executive department, the delegates agreed, were ‘‘vigor, dispatch and responsibility,’’
and Wilson’s proposal met these requirements.
The vote on Wilson’s motion was put over until the questions of
method of selection, length of term, manner of removal, and powers of
the office were determined. The Convention agreed that the executive
should be independent of the legislature, but set its face against direct
popular election of the executive, preferring instead an indirect method
using State electors. ‘‘It would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a
proper character for Chief Magistrate to the people,’’ remarked Gouverneur Morris, ‘‘as it would to refer a trial of colors to a blind man.’’ The
term of office was set at four years, with indefinite re-eligibility, and the
executive was armed with a veto power subject not to approval by a