ContEur9.1 | Page 23

LILIT HARUTYUNYAN
Saudi Arabia also exerts great economic power in Lebanon and its role as guarantor of Lebanon ’ s government debt is critical . Mikati had previously relied on good relations with the Saudi monarchy to mediate with Hariri . Prior to the 2009 parliamentary elections , Saudi Arabia had reportedly engineered an electoral alliance between Hariri , Safadi and Mikati in Tripoli in order to avoid a deep division within the Sunni community . 70 As a businessman who had accumulated his wealth in the Gulf , Mikati also had close links to Saudi Arabia . Upon taking up the position as prime minister , he stressed the importance of close ties to Riyadh . 71 Saudi support for the tribunal is therefore likely to have played a large role in Mikati ’ s decision to provide STL funding .
Conclusion
The civil war ( 1975-1990 ) had left the Sunni community with a leadership vacuum that was filled by Rafik Hariri . From the mid-1990s onwards , Hariri transformed himself from a “ national ” leader to a mostly “ Sunni ” leader . He did so for electoral reasons and used philanthropy to build up a clientelist network . This strategy of “ confessional leadership ” became even more intense under his son Saad , who effectively monopolized Sunni political leadership in the country . This was partly a function of the increasing rift between Sunni and Shia communities , which was driven by domestic and international politics . Hariri ’ s monopoly curtails the ability of politicians such as Mikati or Safadi to lay claim to the post of prime minister .
The rise of the new business elite in Lebanon confirms the importance of class in analyzing Lebanese politics . The emergence of the new businessmen was due to changes in Lebanon ’ s role in the capitalist world economy and the oil boom in the Gulf region . They replaced the traditional commercial-financial bourgeoisie that had dominated the pre-war economy and politics . Rafik Hariri ’ s neoliberal reconstruction program has to be understood in the context of his class interest . The businessman-politician and the neoliberal technocrats in his team were a formidable force for neoliberal reforms . Their ability to realize this project was circumscribed by rival elites – especially former militia leaders – and by Syria . While Hariri was able to shape reconstruction and finance , he was prevented from privatizing state-controlled enterprises . Analyses of Lebanese politics often neglect class and political economy in favor of confessional dynamics and
70
International Crisis Group , Lebanon ’ s Politics : The Sunni Community and Hariri ’ s Future Current , May 26 , 2010 , ( Accessed May 30 , 2020 ). https :// www . crisisgroup . org / middle-east-north-africa / easternmediterranean / lebanon / lebanon-s-politics-sunni-community-and-hariri-s-future-current ( Accessed May 30 , 2020 ).
71
“ Miqati Assures of His Ties with Saudi : The Government is Ready ”, Naharnet , February 26 , 2011 , http :// www . naharnet . com / stories / en / 3449 ( Accessed May 30 , 2020 ).
23