CONTEMPORARY EURASIA IX ( 1 )
However , Hariri ’ s swift “ readiness ” to compromise after an extended period of political crisis and communal mobilization – which even included arming his supporters – resulted in disillusionment with the billionaire ’ s leadership . Some Sunni allies of the “ Future Movement ” distanced themselves from it . 57 Hariri was learning a lesson that the pre-war Sunni zuama had had to learn as well – confessional mobilization makes compromise more difficult .
The governments of Fuad Siniora ( 2005-2009 ) and Saad Hariri ( 2009-2011 ) focused mainly on the struggle against Syria and Hezbollah , but also sought to deepen neoliberal economic reforms . The finance ministry , the Council for Developments and Reconstruction ( CDR ) and central bank were headed by people closely associated with the Hariri camp . The Hariri network thus controlled the most important economic institutions of the country . The commitments of the Siniora government at the “ Paris III ” donor conference in 2007 reiterated the neoliberal program of the previous Hariri governments , including the privatization of state-controlled entities and welfare reform aimed at curtailing patronage opportunities of political rivals . 58
However , this agenda was almost impossible to realize in the face of the interests of rival elites . When the Siniora government mooted the abolishment of the Council of the South and the Central Fund for the Displaced it met determined opposition from Speaker Nabih Berri ( leader of Shia Amal Movement ) and Walid Jumblatt ( leader of Druze Progressive Socialist Party ) who use these institutions as patronage instruments . 59
Saad Hariri ’ s government was brought down by the veto of 8 March ministers in January 2011 over his refusal to renounce the STL that was to indict and try Rafik Hariri ’ s assassins . Mikati assumed the post of prime minister with the backing of 8 March . 14 March refused to participate in this government . Appropriating the language of popular protests in Tunisia and Egypt , The “ Future Movement ” declared a “ day of anger ”. The protesters complained that the Shia Hezbollah had become the decisionmakers in terms of who should be prime minister , a position reserved for Sunnis . As one Sunni cleric put it at a Tripoli rally : “ Saad Hariri is the only man who represents the Sunni faith ... We will not accept Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah choosing our Prime Minister ”. 60 The protesters argued that Hariri was the only true representative of the Sunnis and that Mikati lacked legitimacy – hence the talk of a “ constitutional coup ”. This sense of ownership of the prime minister ’ s post is unprecedented in Lebanese history .
57
Ibid .
58
Lebanese Republic , “ Recovery , Reconstruction , Reform ”, paper presented at the International Conference for Support for Lebanon , Paris , January 25 , 2007 .
59
Lebanon : After the Cedar Revolution , 140 .
60
“ Protests as Hezbollah poised to form Lebanon government ”, BBC News , January 24 , 2011 , http :// www . bbc . co . uk / news / world-middleeast-12272483 ( Accessed April 2 , 2020 ). 20